diff --git a/Make.Rules b/Make.Rules
index 9ca6c89..5b58c59 100644
--- a/Make.Rules
+++ b/Make.Rules
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@
 
 # Compilation specifics
 
-KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include
-IPATH += -fPIC -I$(topdir)/libcap/include -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS)
+KERNEL_HEADERS := $(topdir)/libcap/include/uapi
+IPATH += -fPIC -I$(KERNEL_HEADERS) -I$(topdir)/libcap/include
 
 CC := gcc
 CFLAGS := -O2 -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a6ee1f9..0000000
--- a/libcap/include/linux/capability.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * This is <linux/capability.h>
- *
- * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
- * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
- * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
- *
- * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
- *
- * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
- */
-#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
-
-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-
-
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
-
-extern int file_caps_enabled;
-
-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
-	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-} kernel_cap_t;
-
-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
-struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
-	__u32 magic_etc;
-	kernel_cap_t permitted;
-	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
-};
-
-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
-#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
-
-
-struct file;
-struct inode;
-struct dentry;
-struct user_namespace;
-
-struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
-
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
-
-/*
- * Internal kernel functions only
- */
-
-#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
-	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
-
-/*
- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
- *
- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
- *
- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
- *
- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
- *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
- *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
- */
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-
-#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
-# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
-#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
-
-# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
-# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
-# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-
-#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
-
-# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
-
-#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-
-#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
-do {                                                                \
-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
-		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
-	}                                                           \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
-do {                                                                \
-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
-		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
-	}                                                           \
-} while (0)
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
-				       const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					 const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
-				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	unsigned __capi;
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
-		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
-			return 0;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
- */
-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
-	return cap_isclear(dest);
-}
-
-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-
-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return cap_combine(a,
-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
-	return cap_combine(a,
-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
-}
-
-extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
-			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
-				      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool capable(int cap);
-extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
-extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-
-/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
-
-#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
index 56fc7fd..64ac50e 100644
--- a/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
+++ b/libcap/include/sys/capability.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 #ifndef __user
 #define __user
 #endif
-#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 
 /*
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
similarity index 72%
rename from libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
rename to libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index a3baeb2..289760f 100644
--- a/libcap/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -102,4 +102,51 @@
 
 #define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
 
+/*
+ * Tune up process memory map specifics.
+ */
+#define PR_SET_MM		35
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE		1
+# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE		2
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA		3
+# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA		4
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK		5
+# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK		6
+# define PR_SET_MM_BRK			7
+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START		8
+# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END		9
+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START		10
+# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END		11
+# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV			12
+# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE		13
+
+/*
+ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
+ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
+ */
+#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
+# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
+
+#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	36
+#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER	37
+
+/*
+ * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
+ * execve) will either fail or not grant them.  This affects suid/sgid,
+ * file capabilities, and LSMs.
+ *
+ * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
+ * capset, etc.) will still work.  Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
+ *
+ * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
+ * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
+ * in execve returning -EPERM.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
+ */
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	38
+#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	39
+
+#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS	40
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
similarity index 91%
rename from libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
rename to libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
index 3340617..985aac9 100644
--- a/libcap/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
-#ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
-#define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
 
 /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
    whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
    setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
    changed from user-level. */
 #define issecure_mask(X)	(1 << (X))
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-#define issecure(X)		(issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
-#endif
 
 #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
 
@@ -51,4 +48,4 @@
 				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
 
-#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */