)]}'
{
  "commit": "e2b4de9199610364675b23b82af4768b0f42e6fc",
  "tree": "e1c0ff9092b53ac259266445cb8febe53e40d35c",
  "parents": [
    "24f27f7e9d6fb69ed4a03ecc085bd9d821195e97"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "Dan Williams",
    "email": "dan.j.williams@intel.com",
    "time": "Wed Jan 03 13:54:04 2018 -0800"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Dan Williams",
    "email": "dan.j.williams@intel.com",
    "time": "Fri Jan 12 22:58:49 2018 -0800"
  },
  "message": "vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution\n\nExpectedly, static analysis reports that \u0027fd\u0027 is a user controlled value\nthat is used as a data dependency to read from the \u0027fdt-\u003efd\u0027 array.  In\norder to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block\nspeculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads\nbased on an invalid \u0027file *\u0027 returned from __fcheck_files.\n\nCc: Al Viro \u003cviro@zeniv.linux.org.uk\u003e\nCo-developed-by: Elena Reshetova \u003celena.reshetova@intel.com\u003e\nSigned-off-by: Dan Williams \u003cdan.j.williams@intel.com\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "1c65817673db17f62f668c3760e115d6728b6d21",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "include/linux/fdtable.h",
      "new_id": "9731f1a255dbb93c3e8383149b02e05259cbd42d",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "include/linux/fdtable.h"
    }
  ]
}