[PATCH] SCTP: Validate the parameter length in HB-ACK chunk (CVE-2006-1857)
If SCTP receives a badly formatted HB-ACK chunk, it is possible
that we may access invalid memory and potentially have a buffer
overflow. We should really make sure that the chunk format is
what we expect, before attempting to touch the data.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 8cdba51..9395e09 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,12 @@
commands);
hbinfo = (sctp_sender_hb_info_t *) chunk->skb->data;
+ /* Make sure that the length of the parameter is what we expect */
+ if (ntohs(hbinfo->param_hdr.length) !=
+ sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t)) {
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+ }
+
from_addr = hbinfo->daddr;
link = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &from_addr);
