From 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2011 08:38:05 -0400
Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request

From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>

commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71 upstream.

A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in
the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an
integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request
header.  This results in copying a very large amount of data via
memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap.  Check for underflow.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>


---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
@@ -2741,7 +2741,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struc
 
 	/* Reject if config buffer is too small. */
 	len = cmd_len - sizeof(*req);
-	if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) {
+	if (len < 0 || l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) {
 		l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONF_RSP,
 				l2cap_build_conf_rsp(sk, rsp,
 					L2CAP_CONF_REJECT, flags), rsp);