blob: 26da16f75d31e9d4ed79a76a7249ffb9ce7be05e [file] [log] [blame]
From 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 2010 06:54:53 +0000
Subject: CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc file
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream.
Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct bcm_sock {
struct list_head tx_ops;
unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs;
struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read;
- char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */
+ char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */
};
static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk)
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *so
if (proc_dir) {
/* unique socket address as filename */
- sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);
+ sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk));
bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644,
proc_dir,
&bcm_proc_fops, sk);