blob: 7bd9352bcc6db2e9d9b5cff2cbb98e7464faae38 [file] [log] [blame]
From adb15fdd1648e523fb56c629da5b5466261d47e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 11:31:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
commit e15ca9a0ef9a86f0477530b0f44a725d67f889ee upstream.
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
---
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index 38f08f6b86f6..e5d788faf03b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static int hci_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
+ memset(&uf, 0, sizeof(uf));
uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
uf.opcode = f->opcode;
uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
--
1.8.5.2