blob: f58cc23afcd3efe7651a6c022b65cdbae059d8a2 [file] [log] [blame]
From bafa3bd581a3d69610e24b75f92d69bb6b5e1bdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Larry Finger <>
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 12:02:30 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream.
In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <>
Cc: Stable <>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16")
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <>
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index 1afba937164f..b7fb13af125e 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2818,7 +2818,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
goto out;
- if (!p->pointer) {
+ if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;