diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 64cf8eb..f6c5f78 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@
 	kgid_t			group;
 	struct ns_common	ns;
 	unsigned long		flags;
+	/* parent_could_setfcap: true if the creator if this ns had CAP_SETFCAP
+	 * in its effective capability set at the child ns creation time. */
+	bool			parent_could_setfcap;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	/* List of joinable keyrings in this namespace.  Modification access of
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index c6ca330..2ddb422 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -335,7 +335,8 @@
 
 #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
 
-/* Set or remove capabilities on files */
+/* Set or remove capabilities on files.
+   Map uid=0 into a child user namespace. */
 
 #define CAP_SETFCAP	     31
 
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index af61294..9a4b980 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
 	if (!ns)
 		goto fail_dec;
 
+	ns->parent_could_setfcap = cap_raised(new->cap_effective, CAP_SETFCAP);
 	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fail_free;
@@ -841,6 +842,60 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping
+ * @file: idmapping file
+ * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process
+ * @new_map: requested idmap
+ *
+ * If a process requests mapping parent uid 0 into the new ns, verify that the
+ * process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the target process
+ * will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces.
+ *
+ * Return: true if the mapping is allowed, false if not.
+ */
+static bool verify_root_map(const struct file *file,
+			    struct user_namespace *map_ns,
+			    struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
+{
+	int idx;
+	const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns;
+	struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
+		if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS)
+			extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx];
+		else
+			extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx];
+		if (extent0->lower_first == 0)
+			break;
+
+		extent0 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!extent0)
+		return true;
+
+	if (map_ns == file_ns) {
+		/* The process unshared its ns and is writing to its own
+		 * /proc/self/uid_map.  User already has full capabilites in
+		 * the new namespace.  Verify that the parent had CAP_SETFCAP
+		 * when it unshared.
+		 * */
+		if (!file_ns->parent_could_setfcap)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		/* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who is in a child
+		 * user namespace to p1's.  Verify that the opener of the map
+		 * file has CAP_SETFCAP against the parent of the new map
+		 * namespace */
+		if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
 			 int cap_setid,
@@ -848,7 +903,7 @@
 			 struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
 {
 	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
-	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+	struct user_namespace *map_ns = seq->private;
 	struct uid_gid_map new_map;
 	unsigned idx;
 	struct uid_gid_extent extent;
@@ -895,7 +950,7 @@
 	/*
 	 * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.
 	 */
-	if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, map_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Parse the user data */
@@ -965,7 +1020,7 @@
 
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */
-	if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
+	if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, map_ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -EPERM;
@@ -1086,6 +1141,10 @@
 				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
+
+	if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID && !verify_root_map(file, ns, new_map))
+		return false;
+
 	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
 	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
 	 */