tree c0ef04608628aca64e2c89beed4374e930cd876c
parent acc9eb0a607300be08639fd4449bf51225239c7d
author Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> 1541112750 -0700
committer Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> 1543446893 -0500

f2fs: fs-verity support

Add fs-verity support to f2fs.  fs-verity is a filesystem feature that
enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of read-only
files.  It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle
tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize) time.  It
is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/.
See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for details.

In f2fs, the main change is to the I/O path: ->readpage() and
->readpages() now verify data as it is read from verity files.  Pages
that fail verification are set to PG_error && !PG_uptodate, causing
applications to see an I/O error.

Hooks are also added to several other f2fs filesystem operations:

* ->open(), to deny opening verity files for writing and to set up
  the fsverity_info to prepare for I/O

* ->getattr() to set up the fsverity_info to make stat() show the
  original data size of verity files

* ->setattr() to deny truncating verity files

* update_inode() to write out the full file size rather than the
  original data size, since for verity files the in-memory ->i_size is
  overridden with the original data size.

Finally, the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctls are
wired up.  On f2fs, these ioctls require that the filesystem has the
'verity' feature, i.e. it was created with 'mkfs.f2fs -O verity'.

Like we did in ext4, in f2fs we choose to retain the fs-verity metadata
past the end of the file rather than move it into an xattr, since in
practice this results in the simplest and most efficient implementation.
For example, it avoids needing to add support for external inode xattrs
and for xattr encryption.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>