From 2ebc3464781ad24474abcbd2274e6254689853b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2010 16:58:20 -0400
Subject: Btrfs: fix checks in BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE

From: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>

commit 2ebc3464781ad24474abcbd2274e6254689853b5 upstream.

1.  The BTRFS_IOC_CLONE and BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE ioctls should check
whether the donor file is append-only before writing to it.

2.  The BTRFS_IOC_CLONE_RANGE ioctl appears to have an integer
overflow that allows a user to specify an out-of-bounds range to copy
from the source file (if off + len wraps around).  I haven't been able
to successfully exploit this, but I'd imagine that a clever attacker
could use this to read things he shouldn't.  Even if it's not
exploitable, it couldn't hurt to be safe.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ static noinline long btrfs_ioctl_clone(s
 	 */
 
 	/* the destination must be opened for writing */
-	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) || (file->f_flags & O_APPEND))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = mnt_want_write(file->f_path.mnt);
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static noinline long btrfs_ioctl_clone(s
 
 	/* determine range to clone */
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (off >= src->i_size || off + len > src->i_size)
+	if (off + len > src->i_size || off + len < off)
 		goto out_unlock;
 	if (len == 0)
 		olen = len = src->i_size - off;