Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code

Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.

Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.

Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.

So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.

Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>
[ WT: removed the WARN_ON_ONCE() which is not available in 2.4 and not critical ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <>
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index e392acc..b368505 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -1074,9 +1074,12 @@
 		return -EFAULT;
 	/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
-	   Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info.  */
-	if (info.si_code >= 0)
+	 * Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
+	 */
+	if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
+		/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
 		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	info.si_signo = sig;
 	/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups.  */