Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Change get_random_{int,log} to use the CRNG used by /dev/urandom and
getrandom(2). It's faster and arguably more secure than cut-down MD5
that we had been using.
Also do some code cleanup"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block
random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64
random: use chacha20 for get_random_int/long
random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed
random: remove variable limit
random: remove stale urandom_init_wait
random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 1ef2640..0ab0249 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -313,13 +313,6 @@
static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
/*
- * The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding. We
- * do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the
- * input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom.
- */
-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
-
-/*
* Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
* over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They
* were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
@@ -409,7 +402,6 @@
*/
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
@@ -467,7 +459,6 @@
int entropy_count;
int entropy_total;
unsigned int initialized:1;
- unsigned int limit:1;
unsigned int last_data_init:1;
__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
};
@@ -485,7 +476,6 @@
static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
.name = "input",
- .limit = 1,
.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
.pool = input_pool_data
};
@@ -493,7 +483,6 @@
static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
.name = "blocking",
- .limit = 1,
.pull = &input_pool,
.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),
.pool = blocking_pool_data,
@@ -855,13 +844,6 @@
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
}
-static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void)
-{
- if (crng_init > 2 &&
- time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
-}
-
static inline void crng_wait_ready(void)
{
wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
@@ -1220,15 +1202,6 @@
r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
return;
- if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) {
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
-
- if (time_before(now,
- r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed * HZ))
- return;
- r->last_pulled = now;
- }
-
_xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
}
@@ -1236,8 +1209,6 @@
{
__u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
- /* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */
- int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_bits / 4;
int bytes = nbytes;
/* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
@@ -1248,7 +1219,7 @@
trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
- random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes);
+ random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
}
@@ -1276,7 +1247,7 @@
static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
int reserved)
{
- int entropy_count, orig;
+ int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
size_t ibytes, nfrac;
BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
@@ -1285,14 +1256,12 @@
retry:
entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
ibytes = nbytes;
- /* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit) {
- int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
+ /* never pull more than available */
+ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
- have_bytes = 0;
- ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
- }
+ if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
+ have_bytes = 0;
+ ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
if (ibytes < min)
ibytes = 0;
@@ -1912,6 +1881,7 @@
static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
+static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];
/*
@@ -2042,63 +2012,64 @@
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
-
-int random_int_secret_init(void)
-{
- get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
- return 0;
-}
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash)
- __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
+struct batched_entropy {
+ union {
+ u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
+ u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ };
+ unsigned int position;
+};
/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
- * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
- * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
- * depleting entropy is too high
+ * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
+ * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the
+ * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy.
*/
-unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
+u64 get_random_u64(void)
{
- __u32 *hash;
- unsigned int ret;
+ u64 ret;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
+
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))
+ return ret;
+#else
+ if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) &&
+ arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1))
+ return ret;
+#endif
+
+ batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+ extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
+ batch->position = 0;
+ }
+ ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
+ put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32);
+u32 get_random_u32(void)
+{
+ u32 ret;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
return ret;
- hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
-
- hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();
- md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
- ret = hash[0];
- put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
-
+ batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+ extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
+ batch->position = 0;
+ }
+ ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
+ put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int);
-
-/*
- * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long.
- */
-unsigned long get_random_long(void)
-{
- __u32 *hash;
- unsigned long ret;
-
- if (arch_get_random_long(&ret))
- return ret;
-
- hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
-
- hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy();
- md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
- ret = *(unsigned long *)hash;
- put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
-
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
/**
* randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 7bd2403..ed5c383 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -37,14 +37,26 @@
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int random_int_secret_init(void);
#ifndef MODULE
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
-unsigned int get_random_int(void);
-unsigned long get_random_long(void);
+u32 get_random_u32(void);
+u64 get_random_u64(void);
+static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
+{
+ return get_random_u32();
+}
+static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
+{
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+ return get_random_u64();
+#else
+ return get_random_u32();
+#endif
+}
+
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
u32 prandom_u32(void);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index eae2f15..f9c9d99 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -882,7 +882,6 @@
do_ctors();
usermodehelper_enable();
do_initcalls();
- random_int_secret_init();
}
static void __init do_pre_smp_initcalls(void)
