blob: ffde6402ad78299134c3a6b37286cd104998c2a3 [file] [log] [blame]
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Subject: mseal sysmap: update mseal.rst
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 02:17:10 +0000
Update memory sealing documentation to include details about system
mappings.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250305021711.3867874-7-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Elliot Hughes <enh@google.com>
Cc: Florian Faineli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Waleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcow (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst~mseal-sysmap-update-msealrst
+++ a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
@@ -130,6 +130,26 @@ Use cases
- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
+- System mappings:
+ The system mappings are created by the kernel and includes vdso, vvar,
+ vvar_vclock, vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
+
+ Those system mappings are readonly only or execute only, memory sealing can
+ protect them from ever changing to writable or unmmap/remapped as different
+ attributes. This is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
+ corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system.
+
+ If supported by an architecture (CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS),
+ the CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS seals all system mappings of this
+ architecture.
+
+ The following architectures currently support this feature: x86-64 and arm64.
+
+ WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
+ or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
+ of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
+ this config can't be enabled universally.
+
When not to use mseal
=====================
Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
_