blob: 096169ae7b94022cf349d02341e1005904b3bd6c [file] [log] [blame]
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 13:45:12 +0800
Subject: sctp: fix the issue that the cookie-ack with auth can't get processed
commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 upstream.
When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.
However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
chunk would not get processed.
This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
size <= skb_tail_pointer().
Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/sctp/inqueue.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct s
skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
- if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <
+ if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) <=
skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
/* This is not a singleton */
chunk->singleton = 0;