| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later | |
| /* LRW: as defined by Cyril Guyot in | |
| * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00017.pdf | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (c) 2006 Rik Snel <rsnel@cube.dyndns.org> | |
| * | |
| * Based on ecb.c | |
| * Copyright (c) 2006 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | |
| */ | |
| /* This implementation is checked against the test vectors in the above | |
| * document and by a test vector provided by Ken Buchanan at | |
| * https://www.mail-archive.com/stds-p1619@listserv.ieee.org/msg00173.html | |
| * | |
| * The test vectors are included in the testing module tcrypt.[ch] */ | |
| #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> | |
| #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> | |
| #include <linux/err.h> | |
| #include <linux/init.h> | |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | |
| #include <linux/slab.h> | |
| #include <crypto/b128ops.h> | |
| #include <crypto/gf128mul.h> | |
| #define LRW_BLOCK_SIZE 16 | |
| struct lrw_tfm_ctx { | |
| struct crypto_skcipher *child; | |
| /* | |
| * optimizes multiplying a random (non incrementing, as at the | |
| * start of a new sector) value with key2, we could also have | |
| * used 4k optimization tables or no optimization at all. In the | |
| * latter case we would have to store key2 here | |
| */ | |
| struct gf128mul_64k *table; | |
| /* | |
| * stores: | |
| * key2*{ 0,0,...0,0,0,0,1 }, key2*{ 0,0,...0,0,0,1,1 }, | |
| * key2*{ 0,0,...0,0,1,1,1 }, key2*{ 0,0,...0,1,1,1,1 } | |
| * key2*{ 0,0,...1,1,1,1,1 }, etc | |
| * needed for optimized multiplication of incrementing values | |
| * with key2 | |
| */ | |
| be128 mulinc[128]; | |
| }; | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx { | |
| be128 t; | |
| struct skcipher_request subreq; | |
| }; | |
| static inline void lrw_setbit128_bbe(void *b, int bit) | |
| { | |
| __set_bit(bit ^ (0x80 - | |
| #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN | |
| BITS_PER_LONG | |
| #else | |
| BITS_PER_BYTE | |
| #endif | |
| ), b); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *parent, const u8 *key, | |
| unsigned int keylen) | |
| { | |
| struct lrw_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(parent); | |
| struct crypto_skcipher *child = ctx->child; | |
| int err, bsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| const u8 *tweak = key + keylen - bsize; | |
| be128 tmp = { 0 }; | |
| int i; | |
| crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); | |
| crypto_skcipher_set_flags(child, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(parent) & | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); | |
| err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen - bsize); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| if (ctx->table) | |
| gf128mul_free_64k(ctx->table); | |
| /* initialize multiplication table for Key2 */ | |
| ctx->table = gf128mul_init_64k_bbe((be128 *)tweak); | |
| if (!ctx->table) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| /* initialize optimization table */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) { | |
| lrw_setbit128_bbe(&tmp, i); | |
| ctx->mulinc[i] = tmp; | |
| gf128mul_64k_bbe(&ctx->mulinc[i], ctx->table); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Returns the number of trailing '1' bits in the words of the counter, which is | |
| * represented by 4 32-bit words, arranged from least to most significant. | |
| * At the same time, increments the counter by one. | |
| * | |
| * For example: | |
| * | |
| * u32 counter[4] = { 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0 }; | |
| * int i = lrw_next_index(&counter); | |
| * // i == 33, counter == { 0x0, 0x2, 0x0, 0x0 } | |
| */ | |
| static int lrw_next_index(u32 *counter) | |
| { | |
| int i, res = 0; | |
| for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { | |
| if (counter[i] + 1 != 0) | |
| return res + ffz(counter[i]++); | |
| counter[i] = 0; | |
| res += 32; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If we get here, then x == 128 and we are incrementing the counter | |
| * from all ones to all zeros. This means we must return index 127, i.e. | |
| * the one corresponding to key2*{ 1,...,1 }. | |
| */ | |
| return 127; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * We compute the tweak masks twice (both before and after the ECB encryption or | |
| * decryption) to avoid having to allocate a temporary buffer and/or make | |
| * multiple calls to the 'ecb(..)' instance, which usually would be slower than | |
| * just doing the lrw_next_index() calls again. | |
| */ | |
| static int lrw_xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass) | |
| { | |
| const int bs = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); | |
| const struct lrw_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); | |
| be128 t = rctx->t; | |
| struct skcipher_walk w; | |
| __be32 *iv; | |
| u32 counter[4]; | |
| int err; | |
| if (second_pass) { | |
| req = &rctx->subreq; | |
| /* set to our TFM to enforce correct alignment: */ | |
| skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); | |
| } | |
| err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| iv = (__be32 *)w.iv; | |
| counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]); | |
| counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]); | |
| counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]); | |
| counter[3] = be32_to_cpu(iv[0]); | |
| while (w.nbytes) { | |
| unsigned int avail = w.nbytes; | |
| const be128 *wsrc; | |
| be128 *wdst; | |
| wsrc = w.src.virt.addr; | |
| wdst = w.dst.virt.addr; | |
| do { | |
| be128_xor(wdst++, &t, wsrc++); | |
| /* T <- I*Key2, using the optimization | |
| * discussed in the specification */ | |
| be128_xor(&t, &t, | |
| &ctx->mulinc[lrw_next_index(counter)]); | |
| } while ((avail -= bs) >= bs); | |
| if (second_pass && w.nbytes == w.total) { | |
| iv[0] = cpu_to_be32(counter[3]); | |
| iv[1] = cpu_to_be32(counter[2]); | |
| iv[2] = cpu_to_be32(counter[1]); | |
| iv[3] = cpu_to_be32(counter[0]); | |
| } | |
| err = skcipher_walk_done(&w, avail); | |
| } | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_xor_tweak_pre(struct skcipher_request *req) | |
| { | |
| return lrw_xor_tweak(req, false); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_xor_tweak_post(struct skcipher_request *req) | |
| { | |
| return lrw_xor_tweak(req, true); | |
| } | |
| static void lrw_crypt_done(void *data, int err) | |
| { | |
| struct skcipher_request *req = data; | |
| if (!err) { | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); | |
| rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; | |
| err = lrw_xor_tweak_post(req); | |
| } | |
| skcipher_request_complete(req, err); | |
| } | |
| static void lrw_init_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) | |
| { | |
| const struct lrw_tfm_ctx *ctx = | |
| crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req)); | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); | |
| struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq; | |
| skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child); | |
| skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, lrw_crypt_done, | |
| req); | |
| /* pass req->iv as IV (will be used by xor_tweak, ECB will ignore it) */ | |
| skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst, | |
| req->cryptlen, req->iv); | |
| /* calculate first value of T */ | |
| memcpy(&rctx->t, req->iv, sizeof(rctx->t)); | |
| /* T <- I*Key2 */ | |
| gf128mul_64k_bbe(&rctx->t, ctx->table); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) | |
| { | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); | |
| struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq; | |
| lrw_init_crypt(req); | |
| return lrw_xor_tweak_pre(req) ?: | |
| crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) ?: | |
| lrw_xor_tweak_post(req); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) | |
| { | |
| struct lrw_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); | |
| struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq; | |
| lrw_init_crypt(req); | |
| return lrw_xor_tweak_pre(req) ?: | |
| crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) ?: | |
| lrw_xor_tweak_post(req); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) | |
| { | |
| struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm); | |
| struct crypto_skcipher_spawn *spawn = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); | |
| struct lrw_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); | |
| struct crypto_skcipher *cipher; | |
| cipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(spawn); | |
| if (IS_ERR(cipher)) | |
| return PTR_ERR(cipher); | |
| ctx->child = cipher; | |
| crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(cipher) + | |
| sizeof(struct lrw_request_ctx)); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static void lrw_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) | |
| { | |
| struct lrw_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); | |
| if (ctx->table) | |
| gf128mul_free_64k(ctx->table); | |
| crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->child); | |
| } | |
| static void lrw_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst) | |
| { | |
| crypto_drop_skcipher(skcipher_instance_ctx(inst)); | |
| kfree(inst); | |
| } | |
| static int lrw_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) | |
| { | |
| struct crypto_skcipher_spawn *spawn; | |
| struct skcipher_alg_common *alg; | |
| struct skcipher_instance *inst; | |
| const char *cipher_name; | |
| char ecb_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; | |
| u32 mask; | |
| int err; | |
| err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, &mask); | |
| if (err) | |
| return err; | |
| cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); | |
| if (IS_ERR(cipher_name)) | |
| return PTR_ERR(cipher_name); | |
| inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!inst) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| spawn = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); | |
| err = crypto_grab_skcipher(spawn, skcipher_crypto_instance(inst), | |
| cipher_name, 0, mask); | |
| if (err == -ENOENT && memcmp(cipher_name, "ecb(", 4)) { | |
| err = -ENAMETOOLONG; | |
| if (snprintf(ecb_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ecb(%s)", | |
| cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| err = crypto_grab_skcipher(spawn, | |
| skcipher_crypto_instance(inst), | |
| ecb_name, 0, mask); | |
| } | |
| if (err) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg_common(spawn); | |
| err = -EINVAL; | |
| if (alg->base.cra_blocksize != LRW_BLOCK_SIZE) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| if (alg->ivsize) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| err = crypto_inst_setname(skcipher_crypto_instance(inst), "lrw", | |
| &alg->base); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| err = -EINVAL; | |
| cipher_name = alg->base.cra_name; | |
| /* Alas we screwed up the naming so we have to mangle the | |
| * cipher name. | |
| */ | |
| if (!memcmp(cipher_name, "ecb(", 4)) { | |
| int len; | |
| len = strscpy(ecb_name, cipher_name + 4); | |
| if (len < 2) | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| if (ecb_name[len - 1] != ')') | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| ecb_name[len - 1] = 0; | |
| if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, | |
| "lrw(%s)", ecb_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) { | |
| err = -ENAMETOOLONG; | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| } | |
| } else | |
| goto err_free_inst; | |
| inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority; | |
| inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask | | |
| (__alignof__(be128) - 1); | |
| inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| inst->alg.min_keysize = alg->min_keysize + LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| inst->alg.max_keysize = alg->max_keysize + LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; | |
| inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct lrw_tfm_ctx); | |
| inst->alg.init = lrw_init_tfm; | |
| inst->alg.exit = lrw_exit_tfm; | |
| inst->alg.setkey = lrw_setkey; | |
| inst->alg.encrypt = lrw_encrypt; | |
| inst->alg.decrypt = lrw_decrypt; | |
| inst->free = lrw_free_instance; | |
| err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, inst); | |
| if (err) { | |
| err_free_inst: | |
| lrw_free_instance(inst); | |
| } | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| static struct crypto_template lrw_tmpl = { | |
| .name = "lrw", | |
| .create = lrw_create, | |
| .module = THIS_MODULE, | |
| }; | |
| static int __init lrw_module_init(void) | |
| { | |
| return crypto_register_template(&lrw_tmpl); | |
| } | |
| static void __exit lrw_module_exit(void) | |
| { | |
| crypto_unregister_template(&lrw_tmpl); | |
| } | |
| module_init(lrw_module_init); | |
| module_exit(lrw_module_exit); | |
| MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | |
| MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LRW block cipher mode"); | |
| MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("lrw"); | |
| MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: ecb"); |