|  | /* | 
|  | *  Common NFSv4 ACL handling code. | 
|  | * | 
|  | *  Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The Regents of the University of Michigan. | 
|  | *  All rights reserved. | 
|  | * | 
|  | *  Marius Aamodt Eriksen <marius@umich.edu> | 
|  | *  Jeff Sedlak <jsedlak@umich.edu> | 
|  | *  J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu> | 
|  | * | 
|  | *  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | 
|  | *  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | 
|  | *  are met: | 
|  | * | 
|  | *  1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | 
|  | *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | 
|  | *  2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | 
|  | *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | 
|  | *     documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | 
|  | *  3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its | 
|  | *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived | 
|  | *     from this software without specific prior written permission. | 
|  | * | 
|  | *  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | 
|  | *  WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | 
|  | *  MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE | 
|  | *  DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | 
|  | *  FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | 
|  | *  CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF | 
|  | *  SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | 
|  | *  BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | 
|  | *  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING | 
|  | *  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS | 
|  | *  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <linux/slab.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/nfs_fs.h> | 
|  | #include "acl.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* mode bit translations: */ | 
|  | #define NFS4_READ_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_DATA) | 
|  | #define NFS4_WRITE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_DATA | NFS4_ACE_APPEND_DATA) | 
|  | #define NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE NFS4_ACE_EXECUTE | 
|  | #define NFS4_ANYONE_MODE (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL | NFS4_ACE_SYNCHRONIZE) | 
|  | #define NFS4_OWNER_MODE (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL) | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We don't support these bits; insist they be neither allowed nor denied */ | 
|  | #define NFS4_MASK_UNSUPP (NFS4_ACE_DELETE | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_OWNER \ | 
|  | | NFS4_ACE_READ_NAMED_ATTRS | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS) | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* flags used to simulate posix default ACLs */ | 
|  | #define NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS (NFS4_ACE_FILE_INHERIT_ACE \ | 
|  | | NFS4_ACE_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE) | 
|  |  | 
|  | #define NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS (NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS \ | 
|  | | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE \ | 
|  | | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP) | 
|  |  | 
|  | #define MASK_EQUAL(mask1, mask2) \ | 
|  | ( ((mask1) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) == ((mask2) & NFS4_ACE_MASK_ALL) ) | 
|  |  | 
|  | static u32 | 
|  | mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int mask = NFS4_ANYONE_MODE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (flags & NFS4_ACL_OWNER) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_OWNER_MODE; | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_READ) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE; | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_WRITE) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE; | 
|  | if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE; | 
|  | return mask; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static u32 | 
|  | deny_mask_from_posix(unsigned short perm, u32 flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u32 mask = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_READ) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_READ_MODE; | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_WRITE) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_WRITE_MODE; | 
|  | if ((perm & ACL_WRITE) && (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; | 
|  | if (perm & ACL_EXECUTE) | 
|  | mask |= NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE; | 
|  | return mask; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* XXX: modify functions to return NFS errors; they're only ever | 
|  | * used by nfs code, after all.... */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We only map from NFSv4 to POSIX ACLs when setting ACLs, when we err on the | 
|  | * side of being more restrictive, so the mode bit mapping below is | 
|  | * pessimistic.  An optimistic version would be needed to handle DENY's, | 
|  | * but we espect to coalesce all ALLOWs and DENYs before mapping to mode | 
|  | * bits. */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(u32 perm, unsigned short *mode, unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u32 write_mode = NFS4_WRITE_MODE; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR) | 
|  | write_mode |= NFS4_ACE_DELETE_CHILD; | 
|  | *mode = 0; | 
|  | if ((perm & NFS4_READ_MODE) == NFS4_READ_MODE) | 
|  | *mode |= ACL_READ; | 
|  | if ((perm & write_mode) == write_mode) | 
|  | *mode |= ACL_WRITE; | 
|  | if ((perm & NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) == NFS4_EXECUTE_MODE) | 
|  | *mode |= ACL_EXECUTE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct ace_container { | 
|  | struct nfs4_ace  *ace; | 
|  | struct list_head  ace_l; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static short ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *); | 
|  | static void _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *, struct nfs4_acl *, | 
|  | unsigned int); | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct nfs4_acl * | 
|  | nfs4_acl_posix_to_nfsv4(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct posix_acl *dpacl, | 
|  | unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct nfs4_acl *acl; | 
|  | int size = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (pacl) { | 
|  | if (posix_acl_valid(pacl) < 0) | 
|  | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 
|  | size += 2*pacl->a_count; | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (dpacl) { | 
|  | if (posix_acl_valid(dpacl) < 0) | 
|  | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | 
|  | size += 2*dpacl->a_count; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Allocate for worst case: one (deny, allow) pair each: */ | 
|  | acl = nfs4_acl_new(size); | 
|  | if (acl == NULL) | 
|  | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (pacl) | 
|  | _posix_to_nfsv4_one(pacl, acl, flags & ~NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (dpacl) | 
|  | _posix_to_nfsv4_one(dpacl, acl, flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return acl; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct posix_acl_summary { | 
|  | unsigned short owner; | 
|  | unsigned short users; | 
|  | unsigned short group; | 
|  | unsigned short groups; | 
|  | unsigned short other; | 
|  | unsigned short mask; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void | 
|  | summarize_posix_acl(struct posix_acl *acl, struct posix_acl_summary *pas) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Only pas.users and pas.groups need initialization; previous | 
|  | * posix_acl_valid() calls ensure that the other fields will be | 
|  | * initialized in the following loop.  But, just to placate gcc: | 
|  | */ | 
|  | memset(pas, 0, sizeof(*pas)); | 
|  | pas->mask = 07; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pe = acl->a_entries + acl->a_count; | 
|  |  | 
|  | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { | 
|  | switch (pa->e_tag) { | 
|  | case ACL_USER_OBJ: | 
|  | pas->owner = pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: | 
|  | pas->group = pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_USER: | 
|  | pas->users |= pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_GROUP: | 
|  | pas->groups |= pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_OTHER: | 
|  | pas->other = pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_MASK: | 
|  | pas->mask = pa->e_perm; | 
|  | break; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | /* We'll only care about effective permissions: */ | 
|  | pas->users &= pas->mask; | 
|  | pas->group &= pas->mask; | 
|  | pas->groups &= pas->mask; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We assume the acl has been verified with posix_acl_valid. */ | 
|  | static void | 
|  | _posix_to_nfsv4_one(struct posix_acl *pacl, struct nfs4_acl *acl, | 
|  | unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *group_owner_entry; | 
|  | struct nfs4_ace *ace; | 
|  | struct posix_acl_summary pas; | 
|  | unsigned short deny; | 
|  | int eflag = ((flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) ? | 
|  | NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS | NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE : 0); | 
|  |  | 
|  | BUG_ON(pacl->a_count < 3); | 
|  | summarize_posix_acl(pacl, &pas); | 
|  |  | 
|  | pa = pacl->a_entries; | 
|  | ace = acl->aces + acl->naces; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We could deny everything not granted by the owner: */ | 
|  | deny = ~pas.owner; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * but it is equivalent (and simpler) to deny only what is not | 
|  | * granted by later entries: | 
|  | */ | 
|  | deny &= pas.users | pas.group | pas.groups | pas.other; | 
|  | if (deny) { | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags | NFS4_ACL_OWNER); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | while (pa->e_tag == ACL_USER) { | 
|  | deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask); | 
|  | deny &= pas.groups | pas.group | pas.other; | 
|  | if (deny) { | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; | 
|  | ace->who = pa->e_id; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | } | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask, | 
|  | flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; | 
|  | ace->who = pa->e_id; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* In the case of groups, we apply allow ACEs first, then deny ACEs, | 
|  | * since a user can be in more than one group.  */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* allow ACEs */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | group_owner_entry = pa; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pas.group, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) { | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm & pas.mask, | 
|  | flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; | 
|  | ace->who = pa->e_id; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* deny ACEs */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | pa = group_owner_entry; | 
|  |  | 
|  | deny = ~pas.group & pas.other; | 
|  | if (deny) { | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | } | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  |  | 
|  | while (pa->e_tag == ACL_GROUP) { | 
|  | deny = ~(pa->e_perm & pas.mask); | 
|  | deny &= pas.other; | 
|  | if (deny) { | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag | NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = deny_mask_from_posix(deny, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; | 
|  | ace->who = pa->e_id; | 
|  | ace++; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | } | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (pa->e_tag == ACL_MASK) | 
|  | pa++; | 
|  | ace->type = NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE; | 
|  | ace->flag = eflag; | 
|  | ace->access_mask = mask_from_posix(pa->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | ace->whotype = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE; | 
|  | acl->naces++; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void | 
|  | sort_pacl_range(struct posix_acl *pacl, int start, int end) { | 
|  | int sorted = 0, i; | 
|  | struct posix_acl_entry tmp; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* We just do a bubble sort; easy to do in place, and we're not | 
|  | * expecting acl's to be long enough to justify anything more. */ | 
|  | while (!sorted) { | 
|  | sorted = 1; | 
|  | for (i = start; i < end; i++) { | 
|  | if (pacl->a_entries[i].e_id | 
|  | > pacl->a_entries[i+1].e_id) { | 
|  | sorted = 0; | 
|  | tmp = pacl->a_entries[i]; | 
|  | pacl->a_entries[i] = pacl->a_entries[i+1]; | 
|  | pacl->a_entries[i+1] = tmp; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void | 
|  | sort_pacl(struct posix_acl *pacl) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* posix_acl_valid requires that users and groups be in order | 
|  | * by uid/gid. */ | 
|  | int i, j; | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (pacl->a_count <= 4) | 
|  | return; /* no users or groups */ | 
|  | i = 1; | 
|  | while (pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag == ACL_USER) | 
|  | i++; | 
|  | sort_pacl_range(pacl, 1, i-1); | 
|  |  | 
|  | BUG_ON(pacl->a_entries[i].e_tag != ACL_GROUP_OBJ); | 
|  | j = ++i; | 
|  | while (pacl->a_entries[j].e_tag == ACL_GROUP) | 
|  | j++; | 
|  | sort_pacl_range(pacl, i, j-1); | 
|  | return; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains bitmasks representing | 
|  | * which permission bits have been allowed and which denied to a given | 
|  | * entity: */ | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state { | 
|  | u32 allow; | 
|  | u32 deny; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct posix_user_ace_state { | 
|  | uid_t uid; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state perms; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state_array { | 
|  | int n; | 
|  | struct posix_user_ace_state aces[]; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * While processing the NFSv4 ACE, this maintains the partial permissions | 
|  | * calculated so far: */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct posix_acl_state { | 
|  | int empty; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state owner; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state group; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state other; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state everyone; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state mask; /* Deny unused in this case */ | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state_array *users; | 
|  | struct posix_ace_state_array *groups; | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int | 
|  | init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int alloc; | 
|  |  | 
|  | memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state)); | 
|  | state->empty = 1; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct | 
|  | * named user or group, but we don't no which, so we allocate | 
|  | * enough space for either: | 
|  | */ | 
|  | alloc = sizeof(struct posix_ace_state_array) | 
|  | + cnt*sizeof(struct posix_user_ace_state); | 
|  | state->users = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL); | 
|  | if (!state->users) | 
|  | return -ENOMEM; | 
|  | state->groups = kzalloc(alloc, GFP_KERNEL); | 
|  | if (!state->groups) { | 
|  | kfree(state->users); | 
|  | return -ENOMEM; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void | 
|  | free_state(struct posix_acl_state *state) { | 
|  | kfree(state->users); | 
|  | kfree(state->groups); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void add_to_mask(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state *astate) | 
|  | { | 
|  | state->mask.allow |= astate->allow; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Certain bits (SYNCHRONIZE, DELETE, WRITE_OWNER, READ/WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS, | 
|  | * READ_ATTRIBUTES, READ_ACL) are currently unenforceable and don't translate | 
|  | * to traditional read/write/execute permissions. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * It's problematic to reject acls that use certain mode bits, because it | 
|  | * places the burden on users to learn the rules about which bits one | 
|  | * particular server sets, without giving the user a lot of help--we return an | 
|  | * error that could mean any number of different things.  To make matters | 
|  | * worse, the problematic bits might be introduced by some application that's | 
|  | * automatically mapping from some other acl model. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * So wherever possible we accept anything, possibly erring on the side of | 
|  | * denying more permissions than necessary. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * However we do reject *explicit* DENY's of a few bits representing | 
|  | * permissions we could never deny: | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline int check_deny(u32 mask, int isowner) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_READ_ACL)) | 
|  | return -EINVAL; | 
|  | if (!isowner) | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | if (mask & (NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | NFS4_ACE_WRITE_ACL)) | 
|  | return -EINVAL; | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct posix_acl * | 
|  | posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct posix_acl_entry *pace; | 
|  | struct posix_acl *pacl; | 
|  | int nace; | 
|  | int i, error = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * ACLs with no ACEs are treated differently in the inheritable | 
|  | * and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, we | 
|  | * set a zero-length default posix acl: | 
|  | */ | 
|  | if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT)) { | 
|  | pacl = posix_acl_alloc(0, GFP_KERNEL); | 
|  | return pacl ? pacl : ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | 
|  | } | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * When there are no effective ACEs, the following will end | 
|  | * up setting a 3-element effective posix ACL with all | 
|  | * permissions zero. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n; | 
|  | pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL); | 
|  | if (!pacl) | 
|  | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | 
|  |  | 
|  | pace = pacl->a_entries; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ; | 
|  | error = check_deny(state->owner.deny, 1); | 
|  | if (error) | 
|  | goto out_err; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) { | 
|  | pace++; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_USER; | 
|  | error = check_deny(state->users->aces[i].perms.deny, 0); | 
|  | if (error) | 
|  | goto out_err; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow, | 
|  | &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = state->users->aces[i].uid; | 
|  | add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | pace++; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ; | 
|  | error = check_deny(state->group.deny, 0); | 
|  | if (error) | 
|  | goto out_err; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; | 
|  | add_to_mask(state, &state->group); | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) { | 
|  | pace++; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP; | 
|  | error = check_deny(state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny, 0); | 
|  | if (error) | 
|  | goto out_err; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow, | 
|  | &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = state->groups->aces[i].uid; | 
|  | add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | pace++; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pace++; | 
|  | pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER; | 
|  | error = check_deny(state->other.deny, 0); | 
|  | if (error) | 
|  | goto out_err; | 
|  | low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags); | 
|  | pace->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return pacl; | 
|  | out_err: | 
|  | posix_acl_release(pacl); | 
|  | return ERR_PTR(error); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void allow_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* Allow all bits in the mask not already denied: */ | 
|  | astate->allow |= mask & ~astate->deny; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static inline void deny_bits(struct posix_ace_state *astate, u32 mask) | 
|  | { | 
|  | /* Deny all bits in the mask not already allowed: */ | 
|  | astate->deny |= mask & ~astate->allow; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int find_uid(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct posix_ace_state_array *a, uid_t uid) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++) | 
|  | if (a->aces[i].uid == uid) | 
|  | return i; | 
|  | /* Not found: */ | 
|  | a->n++; | 
|  | a->aces[i].uid = uid; | 
|  | a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow; | 
|  | a->aces[i].perms.deny  = state->everyone.deny; | 
|  |  | 
|  | return i; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void deny_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i=0; i < a->n; i++) | 
|  | deny_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void allow_bits_array(struct posix_ace_state_array *a, u32 mask) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i=0; i < a->n; i++) | 
|  | allow_bits(&a->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, | 
|  | struct nfs4_ace *ace) | 
|  | { | 
|  | u32 mask = ace->access_mask; | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | state->empty = 0; | 
|  |  | 
|  | switch (ace2type(ace)) { | 
|  | case ACL_USER_OBJ: | 
|  | if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_USER: | 
|  | i = find_uid(state, state->users, ace->who); | 
|  | if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->users->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | mask = state->users->aces[i].perms.deny; | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: | 
|  | if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->group, mask); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->group, mask); | 
|  | mask = state->group.deny; | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_GROUP: | 
|  | i = find_uid(state, state->groups, ace->who); | 
|  | if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->groups->aces[i].perms, mask); | 
|  | mask = state->groups->aces[i].perms.deny; | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->group, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  | break; | 
|  | case ACL_OTHER: | 
|  | if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) { | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->group, mask); | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->other, mask); | 
|  | allow_bits(&state->everyone, mask); | 
|  | allow_bits_array(state->users, mask); | 
|  | allow_bits_array(state->groups, mask); | 
|  | } else { | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->owner, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->group, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->other, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits(&state->everyone, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->users, mask); | 
|  | deny_bits_array(state->groups, mask); | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, struct posix_acl **pacl, | 
|  | struct posix_acl **dpacl, unsigned int flags) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct posix_acl_state effective_acl_state, default_acl_state; | 
|  | struct nfs4_ace *ace; | 
|  | int ret; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ret = init_state(&effective_acl_state, acl->naces); | 
|  | if (ret) | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | ret = init_state(&default_acl_state, acl->naces); | 
|  | if (ret) | 
|  | goto out_estate; | 
|  | ret = -EINVAL; | 
|  | for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) { | 
|  | if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE && | 
|  | ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE) | 
|  | goto out_dstate; | 
|  | if (ace->flag & ~NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS) | 
|  | goto out_dstate; | 
|  | if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS) == 0) { | 
|  | process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); | 
|  | continue; | 
|  | } | 
|  | if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR)) | 
|  | goto out_dstate; | 
|  | /* | 
|  | * Note that when only one of FILE_INHERIT or DIRECTORY_INHERIT | 
|  | * is set, we're effectively turning on the other.  That's OK, | 
|  | * according to rfc 3530. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | process_one_v4_ace(&default_acl_state, ace); | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE)) | 
|  | process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace); | 
|  | } | 
|  | *pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags); | 
|  | if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) { | 
|  | ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl); | 
|  | *pacl = NULL; | 
|  | goto out_dstate; | 
|  | } | 
|  | *dpacl = posix_state_to_acl(&default_acl_state, | 
|  | flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); | 
|  | if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) { | 
|  | ret = PTR_ERR(*dpacl); | 
|  | *dpacl = NULL; | 
|  | posix_acl_release(*pacl); | 
|  | *pacl = NULL; | 
|  | goto out_dstate; | 
|  | } | 
|  | sort_pacl(*pacl); | 
|  | sort_pacl(*dpacl); | 
|  | ret = 0; | 
|  | out_dstate: | 
|  | free_state(&default_acl_state); | 
|  | out_estate: | 
|  | free_state(&effective_acl_state); | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static short | 
|  | ace2type(struct nfs4_ace *ace) | 
|  | { | 
|  | switch (ace->whotype) { | 
|  | case NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED: | 
|  | return (ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP ? | 
|  | ACL_GROUP : ACL_USER); | 
|  | case NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER: | 
|  | return ACL_USER_OBJ; | 
|  | case NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP: | 
|  | return ACL_GROUP_OBJ; | 
|  | case NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE: | 
|  | return ACL_OTHER; | 
|  | } | 
|  | BUG(); | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_posix_to_nfsv4); | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix); | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct nfs4_acl * | 
|  | nfs4_acl_new(int n) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct nfs4_acl *acl; | 
|  |  | 
|  | acl = kmalloc(sizeof(*acl) + n*sizeof(struct nfs4_ace), GFP_KERNEL); | 
|  | if (acl == NULL) | 
|  | return NULL; | 
|  | acl->naces = 0; | 
|  | return acl; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct { | 
|  | char *string; | 
|  | int   stringlen; | 
|  | int type; | 
|  | } s2t_map[] = { | 
|  | { | 
|  | .string    = "OWNER@", | 
|  | .stringlen = sizeof("OWNER@") - 1, | 
|  | .type      = NFS4_ACL_WHO_OWNER, | 
|  | }, | 
|  | { | 
|  | .string    = "GROUP@", | 
|  | .stringlen = sizeof("GROUP@") - 1, | 
|  | .type      = NFS4_ACL_WHO_GROUP, | 
|  | }, | 
|  | { | 
|  | .string    = "EVERYONE@", | 
|  | .stringlen = sizeof("EVERYONE@") - 1, | 
|  | .type      = NFS4_ACL_WHO_EVERYONE, | 
|  | }, | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | int | 
|  | nfs4_acl_get_whotype(char *p, u32 len) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) { | 
|  | if (s2t_map[i].stringlen == len && | 
|  | 0 == memcmp(s2t_map[i].string, p, len)) | 
|  | return s2t_map[i].type; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return NFS4_ACL_WHO_NAMED; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | int | 
|  | nfs4_acl_write_who(int who, char *p) | 
|  | { | 
|  | int i; | 
|  |  | 
|  | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s2t_map); i++) { | 
|  | if (s2t_map[i].type == who) { | 
|  | memcpy(p, s2t_map[i].string, s2t_map[i].stringlen); | 
|  | return s2t_map[i].stringlen; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | BUG(); | 
|  | return -1; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_new); | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_get_whotype); | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfs4_acl_write_who); |