blob: 59b67e12010a48b3fe12986522afaf98f78f28ad [file] [log] [blame]
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
# Copyright 2018 Google LLC
#
# Functions for setting up and testing fs-verity
# btrfs will return IO errors on corrupted data with or without fs-verity.
# to really test fs-verity, use nodatasum.
if [ "$FSTYP" == "btrfs" ]; then
if [ -z "$MOUNT_OPTIONS" ]; then
export MOUNT_OPTIONS="-o nodatasum"
else
export MOUNT_OPTIONS+=" -o nodatasum"
fi
fi
# Require fs-verity support on the scratch filesystem.
#
# FSV_BLOCK_SIZE will be set to a Merkle tree block size that is supported by
# the filesystem. Other sizes may be supported too, but FSV_BLOCK_SIZE is the
# only size that is guaranteed to work without any additional checks.
_require_scratch_verity()
{
_require_scratch
_require_command "$FSVERITY_PROG" fsverity
if ! _scratch_mkfs_verity &>>$seqres.full; then
# ext4: need e2fsprogs v1.44.5 or later (but actually v1.45.2+
# is needed for some tests to pass, due to an e2fsck bug)
# f2fs: need f2fs-tools v1.11.0 or later
_notrun "$FSTYP userspace tools don't support fs-verity"
fi
# Try to mount the filesystem. If this fails then either the kernel
# isn't aware of fs-verity, or the mkfs options were not compatible with
# verity (e.g. ext4 with block size != PAGE_SIZE on old kernels).
if ! _try_scratch_mount &>>$seqres.full; then
_notrun "kernel is unaware of $FSTYP verity feature," \
"or mkfs options are not compatible with verity"
fi
local fstyp=${1:-$FSTYP}
local scratch_mnt=${2:-$SCRATCH_MNT}
# The filesystem may be aware of fs-verity but have it disabled by
# CONFIG_FS_VERITY=n. Detect support via sysfs.
if [ ! -e /sys/fs/$fstyp/features/verity ]; then
_notrun "kernel $fstyp isn't configured with verity support"
fi
# Select a default Merkle tree block size for when tests don't
# explicitly specify one.
#
# For consistency reasons, all 'fsverity' subcommands, including
# 'fsverity enable', default to 4K Merkle tree blocks. That's generally
# not ideal for tests, since it's possible that the filesystem doesn't
# support 4K blocks but does support another size. Specifically, the
# kernel originally supported only merkle_tree_block_size ==
# fs_block_size == page_size, and later it was updated to support
# merkle_tree_block_size <= min(fs_block_size, page_size).
#
# Therefore, we default to merkle_tree_block_size == min(fs_block_size,
# page_size). That maximizes the chance of verity actually working.
local fs_block_size=$(_get_block_size $scratch_mnt)
local page_size=$(_get_page_size)
if (( fs_block_size <= page_size )); then
FSV_BLOCK_SIZE=$fs_block_size
else
FSV_BLOCK_SIZE=$page_size
fi
# The filesystem may have fs-verity enabled but not actually usable by
# default. E.g., ext4 only supports verity on extent-based files, so it
# doesn't work on ext3-style filesystems. So, try actually using it.
if ! _fsv_can_enable $scratch_mnt/tmpfile; then
_notrun "$fstyp verity isn't usable by default with these mkfs options"
fi
_scratch_unmount
}
# Check for CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y, as well as the userspace
# commands needed to generate certificates and add them to the kernel.
_require_fsverity_builtin_signatures()
{
if [ ! -e /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures ]; then
_notrun "kernel doesn't support fs-verity builtin signatures"
fi
_require_command "$OPENSSL_PROG" openssl
_require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl
}
# Use the openssl program to generate a private key and a X.509 certificate for
# use with fs-verity built-in signature verification, and convert the
# certificate to DER format.
_fsv_generate_cert()
{
local keyfile=$1
local certfile=$2
local certfileder=$3
if ! $OPENSSL_PROG req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -batch -x509 \
-keyout $keyfile -out $certfile &>> $seqres.full; then
_fail "Failed to generate certificate and private key (see $seqres.full)"
fi
$OPENSSL_PROG x509 -in $certfile -out $certfileder -outform der
}
# Clear the .fs-verity keyring.
_fsv_clear_keyring()
{
$KEYCTL_PROG clear %keyring:.fs-verity
}
# Load the given X.509 certificate in DER format into the .fs-verity keyring so
# that the kernel can use it to verify built-in signatures.
_fsv_load_cert()
{
local certfileder=$1
$KEYCTL_PROG padd asymmetric '' %keyring:.fs-verity \
< $certfileder >> $seqres.full
}
# Disable mandatory signatures for fs-verity files, if they are supported.
_disable_fsverity_signatures()
{
if [ -e /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures ]; then
_set_fsverity_require_signatures 0
fi
}
# Enable mandatory signatures for fs-verity files.
# This assumes that _require_fsverity_builtin_signatures() was called.
_enable_fsverity_signatures()
{
_set_fsverity_require_signatures 1
}
# Restore the original value of fs.verity.require_signatures, i.e. the value it
# had at the beginning of the test.
_restore_fsverity_signatures()
{
if [ -n "$FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_ORIG" ]; then
_set_fsverity_require_signatures "$FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_ORIG"
fi
}
# Restore the previous value of fs.verity.require_signatures, i.e. the value it
# had just before it was last written to.
_restore_prev_fsverity_signatures()
{
if [ -n "$FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_PREV" ]; then
_set_fsverity_require_signatures "$FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_PREV"
fi
}
_set_fsverity_require_signatures()
{
local newval=$1
local oldval=$(</proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures)
FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_PREV=$oldval
if [ -z "$FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_ORIG" ]; then
FSVERITY_SIG_CTL_ORIG=$oldval
fi
echo "$newval" > /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures
}
# Require userspace and kernel support for 'fsverity dump_metadata'.
# $1 must be a file with fs-verity enabled.
_require_fsverity_dump_metadata()
{
local verity_file=$1
local tmpfile=$tmp.require_fsverity_dump_metadata
if _fsv_dump_merkle_tree "$verity_file" 2>"$tmpfile" >/dev/null; then
return
fi
if grep -q "^ERROR: unrecognized command: 'dump_metadata'$" "$tmpfile"
then
_notrun "Missing 'fsverity dump_metadata' command"
fi
if grep -q "^ERROR: FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA failed on '.*': Inappropriate ioctl for device$" "$tmpfile"
then
_notrun "Kernel doesn't support FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA"
fi
_fail "Unexpected output from 'fsverity dump_metadata': $(<"$tmpfile")"
}
# Check for userspace tools needed to corrupt verity data or metadata.
_require_fsverity_corruption()
{
_require_xfs_io_command "fiemap"
if [ $FSTYP == "btrfs" ]; then
_require_btrfs_corrupt_block "value"
fi
}
_scratch_mkfs_verity()
{
case $FSTYP in
ext4|f2fs)
_scratch_mkfs -O verity
;;
btrfs)
_scratch_mkfs
;;
overlay)
_scratch_mkfs # This relies on the scratch fs supporting verity
;;
*)
_notrun "No verity support for $FSTYP"
;;
esac
}
_scratch_mkfs_encrypted_verity()
{
case $FSTYP in
ext4)
_scratch_mkfs -O encrypt,verity
;;
f2fs)
# f2fs-tools as of v1.11.0 doesn't allow comma-separated
# features with -O. Instead -O must be supplied multiple times.
_scratch_mkfs -O encrypt -O verity
;;
*)
_notrun "$FSTYP not supported in _scratch_mkfs_encrypted_verity"
;;
esac
}
_fsv_scratch_begin_subtest()
{
local msg=$1
rm -rf "${SCRATCH_MNT:?}"/*
echo -e "\n# $msg"
}
_fsv_dump_merkle_tree()
{
$FSVERITY_PROG dump_metadata merkle_tree "$@"
}
_fsv_dump_descriptor()
{
$FSVERITY_PROG dump_metadata descriptor "$@"
}
_fsv_dump_signature()
{
$FSVERITY_PROG dump_metadata signature "$@"
}
_fsv_enable()
{
local args=("$@")
# If the caller didn't explicitly specify a Merkle tree block size, then
# use FSV_BLOCK_SIZE.
if ! [[ " $*" =~ " --block-size" ]]; then
args+=("--block-size=$FSV_BLOCK_SIZE")
fi
$FSVERITY_PROG enable "${args[@]}"
}
_fsv_measure()
{
$FSVERITY_PROG measure "$@" | awk '{print $1}'
}
_fsv_digest()
{
local args=("$@")
# If the caller didn't explicitly specify a Merkle tree block size, then
# use FSV_BLOCK_SIZE.
if ! [[ " $*" =~ " --block-size" ]]; then
args+=("--block-size=$FSV_BLOCK_SIZE")
fi
$FSVERITY_PROG digest "${args[@]}" | awk '{print $1}'
}
_fsv_sign()
{
local args=("$@")
# If the caller didn't explicitly specify a Merkle tree block size, then
# use FSV_BLOCK_SIZE.
if ! [[ " $*" =~ " --block-size" ]]; then
args+=("--block-size=$FSV_BLOCK_SIZE")
fi
$FSVERITY_PROG sign "${args[@]}"
}
# Generate a file, then enable verity on it.
_fsv_create_enable_file()
{
local file=$1
shift
head -c $((FSV_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)) /dev/zero > "$file"
_fsv_enable "$file" "$@"
}
_fsv_can_enable()
{
local test_file=$1
shift
local params=("$@")
_disable_fsverity_signatures
rm -f $test_file
head -c 4096 /dev/zero > $test_file
_fsv_enable $test_file "${params[@]}" &>> $seqres.full
local status=$?
_restore_prev_fsverity_signatures
rm -f $test_file
return $status
}
#
# _fsv_scratch_corrupt_bytes - Write some bytes to a file, bypassing the filesystem
#
# Write the bytes sent on stdin to the given offset in the given file, but do so
# by writing directly to the extents on the block device, with the filesystem
# unmounted. This can be used to corrupt a verity file for testing purposes,
# bypassing the restrictions imposed by the filesystem.
#
# The file is assumed to be located on $SCRATCH_DEV.
#
_fsv_scratch_corrupt_bytes()
{
local file=$1
local offset=$2
local lstart lend pstart pend
local dd_cmds=()
local cmd
sync # Sync to avoid unwritten extents
cat > $tmp.bytes
local end=$(( offset + $(_get_filesize $tmp.bytes ) ))
# For each extent that intersects the requested range in order, add a
# command that writes the next part of the data to that extent.
while read -r lstart lend pstart pend; do
lstart=$((lstart * 512))
lend=$(((lend + 1) * 512))
pstart=$((pstart * 512))
pend=$(((pend + 1) * 512))
if (( lend - lstart != pend - pstart )); then
_fail "Logical and physical extent lengths differ for file '$file'"
elif (( offset < lstart )); then
_fail "Hole in file '$file' at byte $offset. Next extent begins at byte $lstart"
elif (( offset < lend )); then
local len=$((lend - offset))
local seek=$((pstart + (offset - lstart)))
dd_cmds+=("head -c $len | dd of=$SCRATCH_DEV oflag=seek_bytes seek=$seek status=none")
(( offset += len ))
fi
done < <($XFS_IO_PROG -r -c "fiemap $offset $((end - offset))" "$file" \
| _filter_xfs_io_fiemap)
if (( offset < end )); then
_fail "Extents of file '$file' ended at byte $offset, but needed until $end"
fi
# Execute the commands to write the data
_scratch_unmount
for cmd in "${dd_cmds[@]}"; do
eval "$cmd"
done < $tmp.bytes
sync # Sync to flush the block device's pagecache
_scratch_mount
}
#
# _fsv_scratch_corrupt_merkle_tree - Corrupt a file's Merkle tree
#
# Like _fsv_scratch_corrupt_bytes(), but this corrupts the file's fs-verity
# Merkle tree. The offset is given as a byte offset into the Merkle tree.
#
_fsv_scratch_corrupt_merkle_tree()
{
local file=$1
local offset=$2
case $FSTYP in
ext4|f2fs)
# ext4 and f2fs store the Merkle tree after the file contents
# itself, starting at the next 65536-byte aligned boundary.
(( offset += ($(_get_filesize $file) + 65535) & ~65535 ))
_fsv_scratch_corrupt_bytes $file $offset
;;
btrfs)
local ino=$(stat -c '%i' $file)
_scratch_unmount
local byte=""
while read -n 1 byte; do
local ascii=$(printf "%d" "'$byte'")
# This command will find a Merkle tree item for the inode (-I $ino,37,0)
# in the default filesystem tree (-r 5) and corrupt one byte (-b 1) at
# $offset (-o $offset) with the ascii representation of the byte we read
# (-v $ascii)
$BTRFS_CORRUPT_BLOCK_PROG -r 5 -I $ino,37,0 \
--value $ascii --offset $offset -b 1 $SCRATCH_DEV
(( offset += 1 ))
done
_scratch_mount
;;
*)
_fail "_fsv_scratch_corrupt_merkle_tree() unimplemented on $FSTYP"
;;
esac
}
_require_fsverity_max_file_size_limit()
{
case $FSTYP in
btrfs|ext4|f2fs)
;;
*)
_notrun "$FSTYP does not store verity data past EOF; no special file size limit"
;;
esac
}
# Replace fs-verity digests, as formatted by the 'fsverity' tool, with <digest>.
# This function can be used by tests where fs-verity digests depend on the
# default Merkle tree block size (FSV_BLOCK_SIZE).
_filter_fsverity_digest()
{
sed -E 's/\b(sha(256|512)):[a-f0-9]{64,}\b/\1:<digest>/'
}