|  | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | 
|  | /* -*- linux-c -*- | 
|  | * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver. | 
|  | * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS] | 
|  | * | 
|  | * Revision 1.2  1996/05/08  20:24:40  shaver | 
|  | * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and | 
|  | * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD. | 
|  | * | 
|  | * | 
|  | */ | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <linux/mm.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/export.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | 
|  | #include <linux/nsproxy.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <net/sock.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #ifdef CONFIG_INET | 
|  | #include <net/ip.h> | 
|  | #endif | 
|  |  | 
|  | #ifdef CONFIG_NET | 
|  | #include <linux/if_ether.h> | 
|  | #endif | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct ctl_table_set * | 
|  | net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set) | 
|  | { | 
|  | return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */ | 
|  | static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, | 
|  | const struct ctl_table *table) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ | 
|  | if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { | 
|  | int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; | 
|  | return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | return table->mode; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head, | 
|  | kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); | 
|  | kuid_t ns_root_uid; | 
|  | kgid_t ns_root_gid; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0); | 
|  | if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid)) | 
|  | *uid = ns_root_uid; | 
|  |  | 
|  | ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); | 
|  | if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid)) | 
|  | *gid = ns_root_gid; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = { | 
|  | .lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup, | 
|  | .permissions = net_ctl_permissions, | 
|  | .set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership, | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net) | 
|  | { | 
|  | setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen); | 
|  | return 0; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net) | 
|  | { | 
|  | retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = { | 
|  | .init = sysctl_net_init, | 
|  | .exit = sysctl_net_exit, | 
|  | }; | 
|  |  | 
|  | static struct ctl_table_header *net_header; | 
|  | __init int net_sysctl_init(void) | 
|  | { | 
|  | static struct ctl_table empty[1]; | 
|  | int ret = -ENOMEM; | 
|  | /* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by | 
|  | * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a | 
|  | * network namespace. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | net_header = register_sysctl_sz("net", empty, 0); | 
|  | if (!net_header) | 
|  | goto out; | 
|  | ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops); | 
|  | if (ret) | 
|  | goto out1; | 
|  | out: | 
|  | return ret; | 
|  | out1: | 
|  | unregister_sysctl_table(net_header); | 
|  | net_header = NULL; | 
|  | goto out; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either: | 
|  | * 1) being read-only, or | 
|  | * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module | 
|  | *    data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was | 
|  | *    allocated. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, | 
|  | struct ctl_table *table, size_t table_size) | 
|  | { | 
|  | struct ctl_table *ent; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path); | 
|  | ent = table; | 
|  | for (size_t i = 0; i < table_size; ent++, i++) { | 
|  | unsigned long addr; | 
|  | const char *where; | 
|  |  | 
|  | pr_debug("  procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n", | 
|  | ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */ | 
|  | if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) { | 
|  | pr_debug("    Not writable by anyone\n"); | 
|  | continue; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Where does data point? */ | 
|  | addr = (unsigned long)ent->data; | 
|  | if (is_module_address(addr)) | 
|  | where = "module"; | 
|  | else if (is_kernel_core_data(addr)) | 
|  | where = "kernel"; | 
|  | else | 
|  | continue; | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global | 
|  | * data, then it's probably a netns leak. | 
|  | */ | 
|  | WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n", | 
|  | path, ent->procname, where, ent->data); | 
|  |  | 
|  | /* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */ | 
|  | ent->mode &= ~0222; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl_sz(struct net *net, | 
|  | const char *path, | 
|  | struct ctl_table *table, | 
|  | size_t table_size) | 
|  | { | 
|  | if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) | 
|  | ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table, table_size); | 
|  |  | 
|  | return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table, table_size); | 
|  | } | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl_sz); | 
|  |  | 
|  | void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header) | 
|  | { | 
|  | unregister_sysctl_table(header); | 
|  | } | 
|  | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table); |