| .. _securitybugs: | 
 |  | 
 | Security bugs | 
 | ============= | 
 |  | 
 | Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd | 
 | like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and | 
 | disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the | 
 | Linux kernel security team. | 
 |  | 
 | Contact | 
 | ------- | 
 |  | 
 | The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at | 
 | <security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers | 
 | who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. | 
 | If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as | 
 | that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the | 
 | security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to | 
 | understand and fix the security vulnerability. | 
 |  | 
 | As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it | 
 | will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in | 
 | 'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what | 
 | information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not | 
 | be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been | 
 | made public. | 
 |  | 
 | Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible. | 
 | It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex | 
 | issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments.  Think of it like a | 
 | :doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>` | 
 | (even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list | 
 | reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text. | 
 |  | 
 | Disclosure and embargoed information | 
 | ------------------------------------ | 
 |  | 
 | The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination | 
 | below. | 
 |  | 
 | Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes | 
 | for publicly known bugs are released immediately. | 
 |  | 
 | Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs | 
 | as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of | 
 | the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start | 
 | of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days | 
 | if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The | 
 | only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate | 
 | the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release | 
 | coordination. | 
 |  | 
 | While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in | 
 | order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside | 
 | the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the | 
 | reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report | 
 | and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the | 
 | identity of the reporter. | 
 |  | 
 | In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other | 
 | information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions | 
 | of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been | 
 | lifted, in perpetuity. | 
 |  | 
 | Coordination with other groups | 
 | ------------------------------ | 
 |  | 
 | While the kernel security team solely focuses on getting bugs fixed, | 
 | other groups focus on fixing issues in distros and coordinating | 
 | disclosure between operating system vendors.  Coordination is usually | 
 | handled by the "linux-distros" mailing list and disclosure by the | 
 | public "oss-security" mailing list, both of which are closely related | 
 | and presented in the linux-distros wiki: | 
 | <https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros> | 
 |  | 
 | Please note that the respective policies and rules are different since | 
 | the 3 lists pursue different goals.  Coordinating between the kernel | 
 | security team and other teams is difficult since for the kernel security | 
 | team occasional embargoes (as subject to a maximum allowed number of | 
 | days) start from the availability of a fix, while for "linux-distros" | 
 | they start from the initial post to the list regardless of the | 
 | availability of a fix. | 
 |  | 
 | As such, the kernel security team strongly recommends that as a reporter | 
 | of a potential security issue you DO NOT contact the "linux-distros" | 
 | mailing list UNTIL a fix is accepted by the affected code's maintainers | 
 | and you have read the distros wiki page above and you fully understand | 
 | the requirements that contacting "linux-distros" will impose on you and | 
 | the kernel community.  This also means that in general it doesn't make | 
 | sense to Cc: both lists at once, except maybe for coordination if and | 
 | while an accepted fix has not yet been merged.  In other words, until a | 
 | fix is accepted do not Cc: "linux-distros", and after it's merged do not | 
 | Cc: the kernel security team. | 
 |  | 
 | CVE assignment | 
 | -------------- | 
 |  | 
 | The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for | 
 | reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may | 
 | delay the bug handling.  If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier | 
 | assigned for a confirmed issue, they can contact the :doc:`kernel CVE | 
 | assignment team<../process/cve>` to obtain one. | 
 |  | 
 | Non-disclosure agreements | 
 | ------------------------- | 
 |  | 
 | The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable | 
 | to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |