| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | 
 | /* -*- linux-c -*- | 
 |  * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver. | 
 |  * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS] | 
 |  * | 
 |  * Revision 1.2  1996/05/08  20:24:40  shaver | 
 |  * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and | 
 |  * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD. | 
 |  * | 
 |  * | 
 |  */ | 
 |  | 
 | #include <linux/mm.h> | 
 | #include <linux/export.h> | 
 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> | 
 | #include <linux/nsproxy.h> | 
 |  | 
 | #include <net/sock.h> | 
 |  | 
 | #ifdef CONFIG_INET | 
 | #include <net/ip.h> | 
 | #endif | 
 |  | 
 | #ifdef CONFIG_NET | 
 | #include <linux/if_ether.h> | 
 | #endif | 
 |  | 
 | static struct ctl_table_set * | 
 | net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set) | 
 | { | 
 | 	return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */ | 
 | static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, | 
 | 			       const struct ctl_table *table) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); | 
 |  | 
 | 	/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ | 
 | 	if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { | 
 | 		int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; | 
 | 		return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; | 
 | 	} | 
 |  | 
 | 	return table->mode; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head, | 
 | 				  kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); | 
 | 	kuid_t ns_root_uid; | 
 | 	kgid_t ns_root_gid; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0); | 
 | 	if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid)) | 
 | 		*uid = ns_root_uid; | 
 |  | 
 | 	ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); | 
 | 	if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid)) | 
 | 		*gid = ns_root_gid; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = { | 
 | 	.lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup, | 
 | 	.permissions = net_ctl_permissions, | 
 | 	.set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership, | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net) | 
 | { | 
 | 	setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen); | 
 | 	return 0; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net) | 
 | { | 
 | 	retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls); | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = { | 
 | 	.init = sysctl_net_init, | 
 | 	.exit = sysctl_net_exit, | 
 | }; | 
 |  | 
 | static struct ctl_table_header *net_header; | 
 | __init int net_sysctl_init(void) | 
 | { | 
 | 	static struct ctl_table empty[1]; | 
 | 	int ret = -ENOMEM; | 
 | 	/* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by | 
 | 	 * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a | 
 | 	 * network namespace. | 
 | 	 */ | 
 | 	net_header = register_sysctl_sz("net", empty, 0); | 
 | 	if (!net_header) | 
 | 		goto out; | 
 | 	ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops); | 
 | 	if (ret) | 
 | 		goto out1; | 
 | out: | 
 | 	return ret; | 
 | out1: | 
 | 	unregister_sysctl_table(net_header); | 
 | 	net_header = NULL; | 
 | 	goto out; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | /* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either: | 
 |  * 1) being read-only, or | 
 |  * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module | 
 |  *    data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was | 
 |  *    allocated. | 
 |  */ | 
 | static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, | 
 | 				   struct ctl_table *table, size_t table_size) | 
 | { | 
 | 	struct ctl_table *ent; | 
 |  | 
 | 	pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path); | 
 | 	ent = table; | 
 | 	for (size_t i = 0; i < table_size; ent++, i++) { | 
 | 		unsigned long addr; | 
 | 		const char *where; | 
 |  | 
 | 		pr_debug("  procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n", | 
 | 			 ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */ | 
 | 		if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) { | 
 | 			pr_debug("    Not writable by anyone\n"); | 
 | 			continue; | 
 | 		} | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Where does data point? */ | 
 | 		addr = (unsigned long)ent->data; | 
 | 		if (is_module_address(addr)) | 
 | 			where = "module"; | 
 | 		else if (is_kernel_core_data(addr)) | 
 | 			where = "kernel"; | 
 | 		else | 
 | 			continue; | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global | 
 | 		 * data, then it's probably a netns leak. | 
 | 		 */ | 
 | 		WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n", | 
 | 		     path, ent->procname, where, ent->data); | 
 |  | 
 | 		/* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */ | 
 | 		ent->mode &= ~0222; | 
 | 	} | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl_sz(struct net *net, | 
 | 						const char *path, | 
 | 						struct ctl_table *table, | 
 | 						size_t table_size) | 
 | { | 
 | 	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) | 
 | 		ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table, table_size); | 
 |  | 
 | 	return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table, table_size); | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl_sz); | 
 |  | 
 | void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header) | 
 | { | 
 | 	unregister_sysctl_table(header); | 
 | } | 
 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table); |