| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| /* | |
| * linux/fs/exec.c | |
| * | |
| * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds | |
| */ | |
| /* | |
| * #!-checking implemented by tytso. | |
| */ | |
| /* | |
| * Demand-loading implemented 01.12.91 - no need to read anything but | |
| * the header into memory. The inode of the executable is put into | |
| * "current->executable", and page faults do the actual loading. Clean. | |
| * | |
| * Once more I can proudly say that linux stood up to being changed: it | |
| * was less than 2 hours work to get demand-loading completely implemented. | |
| * | |
| * Demand loading changed July 1993 by Eric Youngdale. Use mmap instead, | |
| * current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch | |
| * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep | |
| * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary | |
| * formats. | |
| */ | |
| #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> | |
| #include <linux/slab.h> | |
| #include <linux/file.h> | |
| #include <linux/fdtable.h> | |
| #include <linux/mm.h> | |
| #include <linux/stat.h> | |
| #include <linux/fcntl.h> | |
| #include <linux/futex.h> | |
| #include <linux/swap.h> | |
| #include <linux/string.h> | |
| #include <linux/init.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/mm.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/exec_state.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/signal.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> | |
| #include <linux/sched/task.h> | |
| #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
| #include <linux/perf_event.h> | |
| #include <linux/highmem.h> | |
| #include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
| #include <linux/key.h> | |
| #include <linux/personality.h> | |
| #include <linux/binfmts.h> | |
| #include <linux/utsname.h> | |
| #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/namei.h> | |
| #include <linux/mount.h> | |
| #include <linux/security.h> | |
| #include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
| #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> | |
| #include <linux/cn_proc.h> | |
| #include <linux/audit.h> | |
| #include <linux/kmod.h> | |
| #include <linux/fsnotify.h> | |
| #include <linux/fs_struct.h> | |
| #include <linux/oom.h> | |
| #include <linux/compat.h> | |
| #include <linux/vmalloc.h> | |
| #include <linux/io_uring.h> | |
| #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h> | |
| #include <linux/coredump.h> | |
| #include <linux/time_namespace.h> | |
| #include <linux/user_events.h> | |
| #include <linux/rseq.h> | |
| #include <linux/ksm.h> | |
| #include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
| #include <asm/mmu_context.h> | |
| #include <asm/tlb.h> | |
| #include <trace/events/task.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include <trace/events/sched.h> | |
| /* For vma exec functions. */ | |
| #include "../mm/internal.h" | |
| static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm); | |
| int suid_dumpable = 0; | |
| static LIST_HEAD(formats); | |
| static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock); | |
| void __register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt, int insert) | |
| { | |
| write_lock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| insert ? list_add(&fmt->lh, &formats) : | |
| list_add_tail(&fmt->lh, &formats); | |
| write_unlock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(__register_binfmt); | |
| void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) | |
| { | |
| write_lock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| list_del(&fmt->lh); | |
| write_unlock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_binfmt); | |
| static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) | |
| { | |
| module_put(fmt->module); | |
| } | |
| bool path_noexec(const struct path *path) | |
| { | |
| /* If it's an anonymous inode make sure that we catch any shenanigans. */ | |
| VFS_WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ANON_FILE(d_inode(path->dentry)) && | |
| !(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC)); | |
| return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) || | |
| (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_MMU | |
| /* | |
| * The nascent bprm->mm is not visible until exec_mmap() but it can | |
| * use a lot of memory, account these pages in current->mm temporary | |
| * for oom_badness()->get_mm_rss(). Once exec succeeds or fails, we | |
| * change the counter back via acct_arg_size(0). | |
| */ | |
| static void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages) | |
| { | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
| long diff = (long)(pages - bprm->vma_pages); | |
| if (!mm || !diff) | |
| return; | |
| bprm->vma_pages = pages; | |
| add_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES, diff); | |
| } | |
| static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, | |
| int write) | |
| { | |
| struct page *page; | |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma; | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm; | |
| int ret; | |
| /* | |
| * Avoid relying on expanding the stack down in GUP (which | |
| * does not work for STACK_GROWSUP anyway), and just do it | |
| * ahead of time. | |
| */ | |
| if (!mmap_read_lock_maybe_expand(mm, vma, pos, write)) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* | |
| * We are doing an exec(). 'current' is the process | |
| * doing the exec and 'mm' is the new process's mm. | |
| */ | |
| ret = get_user_pages_remote(mm, pos, 1, | |
| write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, | |
| &page, NULL); | |
| mmap_read_unlock(mm); | |
| if (ret <= 0) | |
| return NULL; | |
| if (write) | |
| acct_arg_size(bprm, vma_pages(vma)); | |
| return page; | |
| } | |
| static void put_arg_page(struct page *page) | |
| { | |
| put_page(page); | |
| } | |
| static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| } | |
| static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, | |
| struct page *page) | |
| { | |
| flush_cache_page(bprm->vma, pos, page_to_pfn(page)); | |
| } | |
| static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len) | |
| { | |
| return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN; | |
| } | |
| #else | |
| static inline void acct_arg_size(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pages) | |
| { | |
| } | |
| static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, | |
| int write) | |
| { | |
| struct page *page; | |
| page = bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE]; | |
| if (!page && write) { | |
| page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER|__GFP_ZERO); | |
| if (!page) | |
| return NULL; | |
| bprm->page[pos / PAGE_SIZE] = page; | |
| } | |
| return page; | |
| } | |
| static void put_arg_page(struct page *page) | |
| { | |
| } | |
| static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i) | |
| { | |
| if (bprm->page[i]) { | |
| __free_page(bprm->page[i]); | |
| bprm->page[i] = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static void free_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES; i++) | |
| free_arg_page(bprm, i); | |
| } | |
| static void flush_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos, | |
| struct page *page) | |
| { | |
| } | |
| static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len) | |
| { | |
| return len <= bprm->p; | |
| } | |
| #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ | |
| /* | |
| * Create a new mm_struct and populate it with a temporary stack | |
| * vm_area_struct. We don't have enough context at this point to set the stack | |
| * flags, permissions, and offset, so we use temporary values. We'll update | |
| * them later in setup_arg_pages(). | |
| */ | |
| static int bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; | |
| bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc(); | |
| err = -ENOMEM; | |
| if (!mm) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Staged for would_dump() narrowing; consumed by begin_new_exec(). */ | |
| bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns()); | |
| /* Save current stack limit for all calculations made during exec. */ | |
| task_lock(current->group_leader); | |
| bprm->rlim_stack = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK]; | |
| task_unlock(current->group_leader); | |
| #ifndef CONFIG_MMU | |
| bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *); | |
| #else | |
| err = create_init_stack_vma(bprm->mm, &bprm->vma, &bprm->p); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto err; | |
| #endif | |
| return 0; | |
| err: | |
| if (mm) { | |
| bprm->mm = NULL; | |
| mmdrop(mm); | |
| } | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| struct user_arg_ptr { | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
| bool is_compat; | |
| #endif | |
| union { | |
| const char __user *const __user *native; | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
| const compat_uptr_t __user *compat; | |
| #endif | |
| } ptr; | |
| }; | |
| static const char __user *get_user_arg_ptr(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int nr) | |
| { | |
| const char __user *native; | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
| if (unlikely(argv.is_compat)) { | |
| compat_uptr_t compat; | |
| if (get_user(compat, argv.ptr.compat + nr)) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); | |
| return compat_ptr(compat); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| if (get_user(native, argv.ptr.native + nr)) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); | |
| return native; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * count() counts the number of strings in array ARGV. | |
| */ | |
| static int count(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int max) | |
| { | |
| int i = 0; | |
| if (argv.ptr.native != NULL) { | |
| for (;;) { | |
| const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, i); | |
| if (!p) | |
| break; | |
| if (IS_ERR(p)) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| if (i >= max) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| ++i; | |
| if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) | |
| return -ERESTARTNOHAND; | |
| cond_resched(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| static int count_strings_kernel(const char *const *argv) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| if (!argv) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i = 0; argv[i]; ++i) { | |
| if (i >= MAX_ARG_STRINGS) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) | |
| return -ERESTARTNOHAND; | |
| cond_resched(); | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| static inline int bprm_set_stack_limit(struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
| unsigned long limit) | |
| { | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_MMU | |
| /* Avoid a pathological bprm->p. */ | |
| if (bprm->p < limit) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| bprm->argmin = bprm->p - limit; | |
| #endif | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static inline bool bprm_hit_stack_limit(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_MMU | |
| return bprm->p < bprm->argmin; | |
| #else | |
| return false; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Calculate bprm->argmin from: | |
| * - _STK_LIM | |
| * - ARG_MAX | |
| * - bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur | |
| * - bprm->argc | |
| * - bprm->envc | |
| * - bprm->p | |
| */ | |
| static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long limit, ptr_size; | |
| /* | |
| * Limit to 1/4 of the max stack size or 3/4 of _STK_LIM | |
| * (whichever is smaller) for the argv+env strings. | |
| * This ensures that: | |
| * - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space, | |
| * - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left | |
| * to work from. | |
| */ | |
| limit = _STK_LIM / 4 * 3; | |
| limit = min(limit, bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur / 4); | |
| /* | |
| * We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX) | |
| * of argument strings even with small stacks | |
| */ | |
| limit = max_t(unsigned long, limit, ARG_MAX); | |
| /* Reject totally pathological counts. */ | |
| if (bprm->argc < 0 || bprm->envc < 0) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| /* | |
| * We must account for the size of all the argv and envp pointers to | |
| * the argv and envp strings, since they will also take up space in | |
| * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't | |
| * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. | |
| * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. | |
| * | |
| * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a | |
| * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused | |
| * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking | |
| * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. | |
| * See do_execveat_common(). | |
| */ | |
| if (check_add_overflow(max(bprm->argc, 1), bprm->envc, &ptr_size) || | |
| check_mul_overflow(ptr_size, sizeof(void *), &ptr_size)) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| if (limit <= ptr_size) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| limit -= ptr_size; | |
| return bprm_set_stack_limit(bprm, limit); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * 'copy_strings()' copies argument/environment strings from the old | |
| * processes's memory to the new process's stack. The call to get_user_pages() | |
| * ensures the destination page is created and not swapped out. | |
| */ | |
| static int copy_strings(int argc, struct user_arg_ptr argv, | |
| struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct page *kmapped_page = NULL; | |
| char *kaddr = NULL; | |
| unsigned long kpos = 0; | |
| int ret; | |
| while (argc-- > 0) { | |
| const char __user *str; | |
| int len; | |
| unsigned long pos; | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| str = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, argc); | |
| if (IS_ERR(str)) | |
| goto out; | |
| len = strnlen_user(str, MAX_ARG_STRLEN); | |
| if (!len) | |
| goto out; | |
| ret = -E2BIG; | |
| if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len)) | |
| goto out; | |
| /* We're going to work our way backwards. */ | |
| pos = bprm->p; | |
| str += len; | |
| bprm->p -= len; | |
| if (bprm_hit_stack_limit(bprm)) | |
| goto out; | |
| while (len > 0) { | |
| int offset, bytes_to_copy; | |
| if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) { | |
| ret = -ERESTARTNOHAND; | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| cond_resched(); | |
| offset = pos % PAGE_SIZE; | |
| if (offset == 0) | |
| offset = PAGE_SIZE; | |
| bytes_to_copy = offset; | |
| if (bytes_to_copy > len) | |
| bytes_to_copy = len; | |
| offset -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| pos -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| str -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| len -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| if (!kmapped_page || kpos != (pos & PAGE_MASK)) { | |
| struct page *page; | |
| page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1); | |
| if (!page) { | |
| ret = -E2BIG; | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| if (kmapped_page) { | |
| flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page); | |
| kunmap_local(kaddr); | |
| put_arg_page(kmapped_page); | |
| } | |
| kmapped_page = page; | |
| kaddr = kmap_local_page(kmapped_page); | |
| kpos = pos & PAGE_MASK; | |
| flush_arg_page(bprm, kpos, kmapped_page); | |
| } | |
| if (copy_from_user(kaddr+offset, str, bytes_to_copy)) { | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 0; | |
| out: | |
| if (kmapped_page) { | |
| flush_dcache_page(kmapped_page); | |
| kunmap_local(kaddr); | |
| put_arg_page(kmapped_page); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Copy and argument/environment string from the kernel to the processes stack. | |
| */ | |
| int copy_string_kernel(const char *arg, struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| int len = strnlen(arg, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) + 1 /* terminating NUL */; | |
| unsigned long pos = bprm->p; | |
| if (len == 0) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| if (!valid_arg_len(bprm, len)) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| /* We're going to work our way backwards. */ | |
| arg += len; | |
| bprm->p -= len; | |
| if (bprm_hit_stack_limit(bprm)) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| while (len > 0) { | |
| unsigned int bytes_to_copy = min(len, | |
| min_not_zero(offset_in_page(pos), PAGE_SIZE)); | |
| struct page *page; | |
| pos -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| arg -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| len -= bytes_to_copy; | |
| page = get_arg_page(bprm, pos, 1); | |
| if (!page) | |
| return -E2BIG; | |
| flush_arg_page(bprm, pos & PAGE_MASK, page); | |
| memcpy_to_page(page, offset_in_page(pos), arg, bytes_to_copy); | |
| put_arg_page(page); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_string_kernel); | |
| static int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *argv, | |
| struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| while (argc-- > 0) { | |
| int ret = copy_string_kernel(argv[argc], bprm); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| return ret; | |
| if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) | |
| return -ERESTARTNOHAND; | |
| cond_resched(); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_MMU | |
| /* | |
| * Finalizes the stack vm_area_struct. The flags and permissions are updated, | |
| * the stack is optionally relocated, and some extra space is added. | |
| */ | |
| int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
| unsigned long stack_top, | |
| int executable_stack) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| unsigned long stack_shift; | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma; | |
| struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL; | |
| vm_flags_t vm_flags; | |
| unsigned long stack_base; | |
| unsigned long stack_size; | |
| unsigned long stack_expand; | |
| unsigned long rlim_stack; | |
| struct mmu_gather tlb; | |
| struct vma_iterator vmi; | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP | |
| /* Limit stack size */ | |
| stack_base = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_max; | |
| stack_base = calc_max_stack_size(stack_base); | |
| /* Add space for stack randomization. */ | |
| if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) | |
| stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); | |
| /* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */ | |
| if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| stack_base = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top - stack_base); | |
| stack_shift = vma->vm_start - stack_base; | |
| mm->arg_start = bprm->p - stack_shift; | |
| bprm->p = vma->vm_end - stack_shift; | |
| #else | |
| stack_top = arch_align_stack(stack_top); | |
| stack_top = PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top); | |
| if (unlikely(stack_top < mmap_min_addr) || | |
| unlikely(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start >= stack_top - mmap_min_addr)) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| stack_shift = vma->vm_end - stack_top; | |
| bprm->p -= stack_shift; | |
| mm->arg_start = bprm->p; | |
| #endif | |
| bprm->exec -= stack_shift; | |
| if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) | |
| return -EINTR; | |
| vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; | |
| /* | |
| * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for | |
| * EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone | |
| * (arch default) otherwise. | |
| */ | |
| if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X)) | |
| vm_flags |= VM_EXEC; | |
| else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X) | |
| vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC; | |
| vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; | |
| vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; | |
| vma_iter_init(&vmi, mm, vma->vm_start); | |
| tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm); | |
| ret = mprotect_fixup(&vmi, &tlb, vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, | |
| vm_flags); | |
| tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| BUG_ON(prev != vma); | |
| if (unlikely(vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { | |
| pr_warn_once("process '%pD4' started with executable stack\n", | |
| bprm->file); | |
| } | |
| /* Move stack pages down in memory. */ | |
| if (stack_shift) { | |
| /* | |
| * During bprm_mm_init(), we create a temporary stack at STACK_TOP_MAX. Once | |
| * the binfmt code determines where the new stack should reside, we shift it to | |
| * its final location. | |
| */ | |
| ret = relocate_vma_down(vma, stack_shift); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| } | |
| /* mprotect_fixup is overkill to remove the temporary stack flags */ | |
| vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP); | |
| stack_expand = 131072UL; /* randomly 32*4k (or 2*64k) pages */ | |
| stack_size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; | |
| /* | |
| * Align this down to a page boundary as expand_stack | |
| * will align it up. | |
| */ | |
| rlim_stack = bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur & PAGE_MASK; | |
| stack_expand = min(rlim_stack, stack_size + stack_expand); | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP | |
| stack_base = vma->vm_start + stack_expand; | |
| #else | |
| stack_base = vma->vm_end - stack_expand; | |
| #endif | |
| current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p; | |
| ret = expand_stack_locked(vma, stack_base); | |
| if (ret) | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| out_unlock: | |
| mmap_write_unlock(mm); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages); | |
| #else | |
| /* | |
| * Transfer the program arguments and environment from the holding pages | |
| * onto the stack. The provided stack pointer is adjusted accordingly. | |
| */ | |
| int transfer_args_to_stack(struct linux_binprm *bprm, | |
| unsigned long *sp_location) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long index, stop, sp; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| stop = bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT; | |
| sp = *sp_location; | |
| for (index = MAX_ARG_PAGES; index-- > stop; ) { | |
| unsigned int offset = index == stop ? bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK : 0; | |
| char *src = kmap_local_page(bprm->page[index]) + offset; | |
| sp -= PAGE_SIZE - offset; | |
| if (copy_to_user((void *) sp, src, PAGE_SIZE - offset) != 0) | |
| ret = -EFAULT; | |
| kunmap_local(src); | |
| if (ret) | |
| goto out; | |
| } | |
| bprm->exec += *sp_location - MAX_ARG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE; | |
| *sp_location = sp; | |
| out: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(transfer_args_to_stack); | |
| #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ | |
| /* | |
| * On success, caller must call do_close_execat() on the returned | |
| * struct file to close it. | |
| */ | |
| static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) | |
| { | |
| int err; | |
| struct file *file __free(fput) = NULL; | |
| struct open_flags open_exec_flags = { | |
| .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC, | |
| .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC, | |
| .intent = LOOKUP_OPEN, | |
| .lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW, | |
| }; | |
| if ((flags & | |
| ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK)) != 0) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | |
| if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) | |
| open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW; | |
| file = do_file_open(fd, name, &open_exec_flags); | |
| if (IS_ERR(file)) | |
| return file; | |
| if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); | |
| /* | |
| * In the past the regular type check was here. It moved to may_open() in | |
| * 633fb6ac3980 ("exec: move S_ISREG() check earlier"). Since then it is | |
| * an invariant that all non-regular files error out before we get here. | |
| */ | |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))) | |
| return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); | |
| err = exe_file_deny_write_access(file); | |
| if (err) | |
| return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| return no_free_ptr(file); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * open_exec - Open a path name for execution | |
| * | |
| * @name: path name to open with the intent of executing it. | |
| * | |
| * Returns ERR_PTR on failure or allocated struct file on success. | |
| * | |
| * As this is a wrapper for the internal do_open_execat(), callers | |
| * must call exe_file_allow_write_access() before fput() on release. Also see | |
| * do_close_execat(). | |
| */ | |
| struct file *open_exec(const char *name) | |
| { | |
| CLASS(filename_kernel, filename)(name); | |
| return do_open_execat(AT_FDCWD, filename, 0); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec); | |
| #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC) | |
| ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len) | |
| { | |
| ssize_t res = vfs_read(file, (void __user *)addr, len, &pos); | |
| if (res > 0) | |
| flush_icache_user_range(addr, addr + len); | |
| return res; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code); | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct. | |
| * On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock | |
| * held for writing. The replaced address space is stashed in | |
| * bprm->old_mm for setup_new_exec() to release outside the lock. | |
| */ | |
| static int exec_mmap(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct task_exec_state *exec_state __free(put_task_exec_state) = NULL; | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = bprm->mm; | |
| struct task_struct *tsk; | |
| struct mm_struct *old_mm, *active_mm; | |
| int ret; | |
| exec_state = alloc_task_exec_state(bprm->user_ns); | |
| if (!exec_state) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| /* Notify parent that we're no longer interested in the old VM */ | |
| tsk = current; | |
| old_mm = current->mm; | |
| /* Clean up futexes and release the mm */ | |
| mm_exit_exec_release(tsk, old_mm); | |
| ret = down_write_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); | |
| if (ret) | |
| return ret; | |
| if (old_mm) { | |
| /* | |
| * If there is a pending fatal signal perhaps a signal | |
| * whose default action is to create a coredump get | |
| * out and die instead of going through with the exec. | |
| */ | |
| ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(old_mm); | |
| if (ret) { | |
| up_write(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| task_lock(tsk); | |
| membarrier_exec_mmap(mm); | |
| local_irq_disable(); | |
| active_mm = tsk->active_mm; | |
| tsk->active_mm = mm; | |
| tsk->mm = mm; | |
| mm_init_cid(mm, tsk); | |
| exec_state = task_exec_state_replace(tsk, exec_state); | |
| /* | |
| * This prevents preemption while active_mm is being loaded and | |
| * it and mm are being updated, which could cause problems for | |
| * lazy tlb mm refcounting when these are updated by context | |
| * switches. Not all architectures can handle irqs off over | |
| * activate_mm yet. | |
| */ | |
| if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM)) | |
| local_irq_enable(); | |
| activate_mm(active_mm, mm); | |
| if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM)) | |
| local_irq_enable(); | |
| lru_gen_add_mm(mm); | |
| task_unlock(tsk); | |
| lru_gen_use_mm(mm); | |
| if (old_mm) { | |
| mmap_read_unlock(old_mm); | |
| BUG_ON(active_mm != old_mm); | |
| /* Defer teardown to setup_new_exec(), outside the exec locks. */ | |
| bprm->old_mm = old_mm; | |
| } else { | |
| mmdrop_lazy_tlb(active_mm); | |
| } | |
| futex_exec_done(tsk); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Release the address space replaced by exec, outside the exec locks. */ | |
| static void exec_mm_put_old(struct mm_struct *old_mm) | |
| { | |
| setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(¤t->signal->maxrss, old_mm); | |
| mm_update_next_owner(old_mm); | |
| mmput(old_mm); | |
| } | |
| static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
| { | |
| struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; | |
| struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand; | |
| spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock; | |
| if (thread_group_empty(tsk)) | |
| goto no_thread_group; | |
| /* | |
| * Kill all other threads in the thread group. | |
| */ | |
| spin_lock_irq(lock); | |
| if ((sig->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) || sig->group_exec_task) { | |
| /* | |
| * Another group action in progress, just | |
| * return so that the signal is processed. | |
| */ | |
| spin_unlock_irq(lock); | |
| return -EAGAIN; | |
| } | |
| sig->group_exec_task = tsk; | |
| sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk); | |
| if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) | |
| sig->notify_count--; | |
| while (sig->notify_count) { | |
| __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); | |
| spin_unlock_irq(lock); | |
| schedule(); | |
| if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)) | |
| goto killed; | |
| spin_lock_irq(lock); | |
| } | |
| spin_unlock_irq(lock); | |
| /* | |
| * At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to | |
| * do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive, | |
| * and to assume its PID: | |
| */ | |
| if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) { | |
| struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader; | |
| for (;;) { | |
| cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(tsk); | |
| write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
| /* | |
| * Do this under tasklist_lock to ensure that | |
| * exit_notify() can't miss ->group_exec_task | |
| */ | |
| sig->notify_count = -1; | |
| if (likely(leader->exit_state)) | |
| break; | |
| __set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE); | |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
| cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk); | |
| schedule(); | |
| if (__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)) | |
| goto killed; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The only record we have of the real-time age of a | |
| * process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time. | |
| * All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct | |
| * from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader | |
| * exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread, | |
| * whose birth marks the true age of this process now. | |
| * When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we | |
| * also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own). | |
| */ | |
| tsk->start_time = leader->start_time; | |
| tsk->start_boottime = leader->start_boottime; | |
| BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk)); | |
| /* | |
| * An exec() starts a new thread group with the | |
| * TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the | |
| * two threads with a switched PID, and release | |
| * the former thread group leader: | |
| */ | |
| /* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid. | |
| * The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group. | |
| */ | |
| exchange_tids(tsk, leader); | |
| transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_TGID); | |
| transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID); | |
| transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID); | |
| list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks); | |
| list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling); | |
| tsk->group_leader = tsk; | |
| leader->group_leader = tsk; | |
| tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; | |
| leader->exit_signal = -1; | |
| BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE); | |
| leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD; | |
| /* | |
| * We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently, | |
| * the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees | |
| * the tracer won't block again waiting for this thread. | |
| */ | |
| if (unlikely(leader->ptrace)) | |
| __wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent); | |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
| cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk); | |
| release_task(leader); | |
| } | |
| sig->group_exec_task = NULL; | |
| sig->notify_count = 0; | |
| no_thread_group: | |
| /* we have changed execution domain */ | |
| tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; | |
| BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk)); | |
| return 0; | |
| killed: | |
| /* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */ | |
| read_lock(&tasklist_lock); | |
| sig->group_exec_task = NULL; | |
| sig->notify_count = 0; | |
| read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); | |
| return -EAGAIN; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table, | |
| * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without | |
| * disturbing other processes. (Other processes might share the signal | |
| * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().) | |
| */ | |
| static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me) | |
| { | |
| struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand; | |
| if (refcount_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) { | |
| struct sighand_struct *newsighand; | |
| /* | |
| * This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND | |
| * but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one. | |
| */ | |
| newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!newsighand) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| refcount_set(&newsighand->count, 1); | |
| write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
| spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock); | |
| memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action, | |
| sizeof(newsighand->action)); | |
| rcu_assign_pointer(me->sighand, newsighand); | |
| spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock); | |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); | |
| __cleanup_sighand(oldsighand); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This is unlocked -- the string will always be NUL-terminated, but | |
| * may show overlapping contents if racing concurrent reads. | |
| */ | |
| void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec) | |
| { | |
| size_t len = strnlen(buf, sizeof(tsk->comm) - 1); | |
| trace_task_rename(tsk, buf); | |
| memcpy(tsk->comm, buf, len); | |
| memset(&tsk->comm[len], 0, sizeof(tsk->comm) - len); | |
| perf_event_comm(tsk, exec); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The file the process presents as: its exe link and comm. A transparent | |
| * dispatch presents as the binary, which is bprm->executable. | |
| */ | |
| static struct file *bprm_identity_file(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP) | |
| return bprm->executable; | |
| return bprm->file; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be | |
| * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal | |
| * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised | |
| * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below). | |
| */ | |
| int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct task_struct *me = current; | |
| int retval; | |
| /* A pending PT_INTERP substitution this format cannot consume. */ | |
| if (bprm->loader) | |
| return -ENOEXEC; | |
| /* Once we are committed compute the creds */ | |
| retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm); | |
| if (retval) | |
| return retval; | |
| /* | |
| * This tracepoint marks the point before flushing the old exec where | |
| * the current task is still unchanged, but errors are fatal (point of | |
| * no return). The later "sched_process_exec" tracepoint is called after | |
| * the current task has successfully switched to the new exec. | |
| */ | |
| trace_sched_prepare_exec(current, bprm); | |
| /* | |
| * Ensure all future errors are fatal. | |
| */ | |
| bprm->point_of_no_return = true; | |
| /* Make this the only thread in the thread group */ | |
| retval = de_thread(me); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out; | |
| /* see the comment in check_unsafe_exec() */ | |
| current->fs->in_exec = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve | |
| */ | |
| io_uring_task_cancel(); | |
| /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */ | |
| retval = unshare_files(); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out; | |
| /* | |
| * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is | |
| * not visible until then. Doing it here also ensures | |
| * we don't race against replace_mm_exe_file(). | |
| */ | |
| retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm_identity_file(bprm)); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out; | |
| /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */ | |
| would_dump(bprm, bprm->file); | |
| if (bprm->have_execfd) | |
| would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable); | |
| /* | |
| * Release all of the old mmap stuff | |
| */ | |
| acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); | |
| retval = exec_mmap(bprm); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out; | |
| bprm->mm = NULL; | |
| retval = exec_task_namespaces(); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS | |
| spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock); | |
| posix_cpu_timers_exit(me); | |
| spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock); | |
| exit_itimers(me); | |
| flush_itimer_signals(); | |
| #endif | |
| /* | |
| * Make the signal table private. | |
| */ | |
| retval = unshare_sighand(me); | |
| if (retval) | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | | |
| PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); | |
| flush_thread(); | |
| me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; | |
| clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me); | |
| /* | |
| * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is | |
| * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace | |
| * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process | |
| * undergoing exec(2). | |
| */ | |
| do_close_on_exec(me->files); | |
| if (bprm->secureexec) { | |
| /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */ | |
| me->pdeath_signal = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to | |
| * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to | |
| * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines | |
| * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid | |
| * needing to clean up the change on failure. | |
| */ | |
| if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM) | |
| bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM; | |
| } | |
| me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current | |
| * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing | |
| * bprm->secureexec instead. | |
| */ | |
| if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP || | |
| !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && | |
| gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))) | |
| task_exec_state_set_dumpable(suid_dumpable); | |
| else | |
| task_exec_state_set_dumpable(TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER); | |
| perf_event_exec(); | |
| /* | |
| * If the original filename was empty, alloc_bprm() made up a path | |
| * that will probably not be useful to admins running ps or similar. | |
| * Let's fix it up to be something reasonable. | |
| */ | |
| if (bprm->comm_from_dentry) { | |
| struct file *comm_file = bprm_identity_file(bprm); | |
| /* | |
| * Hold RCU lock to keep the name from being freed behind our back. | |
| * Use acquire semantics to make sure the terminating NUL from | |
| * __d_alloc() is seen. | |
| * | |
| * Note, we're deliberately sloppy here. We don't need to care about | |
| * detecting a concurrent rename and just want a terminated name. | |
| */ | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| __set_task_comm(me, smp_load_acquire(&comm_file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name), | |
| true); | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| } else { | |
| __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true); | |
| } | |
| /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread | |
| group */ | |
| WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1); | |
| flush_signal_handlers(me, 0); | |
| retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| /* | |
| * install the new credentials for this executable | |
| */ | |
| security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm); | |
| commit_creds(bprm->cred); | |
| bprm->cred = NULL; | |
| /* | |
| * Disable monitoring for regular users | |
| * when executing setuid binaries. Must | |
| * wait until new credentials are committed | |
| * by commit_creds() above | |
| */ | |
| if (task_exec_state_get_dumpable(me) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) | |
| perf_event_exit_task(me); | |
| /* | |
| * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent | |
| * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's | |
| * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked. | |
| */ | |
| security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm); | |
| /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */ | |
| if (bprm->have_execfd) { | |
| struct file *executable = bprm->executable; | |
| /* mm->exe_file carries its own write denial now so drop it. */ | |
| exe_file_allow_write_access(executable); | |
| bprm->executable = NULL; | |
| retval = FD_ADD(0, executable); | |
| if (retval < 0) { | |
| /* The reference was not consumed. */ | |
| fput(executable); | |
| goto out_unlock; | |
| } | |
| bprm->execfd = retval; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| out_unlock: | |
| up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock); | |
| if (!bprm->cred) | |
| mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | |
| out: | |
| return retval; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec); | |
| void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) | |
| { | |
| struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); | |
| struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); | |
| if (inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_READ) < 0) { | |
| struct user_namespace *old, *user_ns; | |
| bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP; | |
| /* Ensure bprm->user_ns contains the executable. */ | |
| user_ns = old = bprm->user_ns; | |
| while ((user_ns != &init_user_ns) && | |
| !privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, inode)) | |
| user_ns = user_ns->parent; | |
| if (old != user_ns) { | |
| bprm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); | |
| put_user_ns(old); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump); | |
| void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) | |
| { | |
| /* Setup things that can depend upon the personality */ | |
| struct task_struct *me = current; | |
| arch_pick_mmap_layout(me->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack); | |
| arch_setup_new_exec(); | |
| /* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may | |
| * depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on | |
| * some architectures like powerpc | |
| */ | |
| me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE; | |
| up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock); | |
| mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | |
| /* The exec locks are dropped: release the old address space now. */ | |
| if (bprm->old_mm) { | |
| exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm); | |
| bprm->old_mm = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); | |
| /* Runs immediately before start_thread() takes over. */ | |
| void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| /* Store any stack rlimit changes before starting thread. */ | |
| task_lock(current->group_leader); | |
| current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK] = bprm->rlim_stack; | |
| task_unlock(current->group_leader); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec); | |
| /* | |
| * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex. | |
| * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock. | |
| * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred | |
| * and unlock. | |
| */ | |
| static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) | |
| return -ERESTARTNOINTR; | |
| bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); | |
| if (likely(bprm->cred)) | |
| return 0; | |
| mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| } | |
| /* Matches do_open_execat() */ | |
| static void do_close_execat(struct file *file) | |
| { | |
| if (!file) | |
| return; | |
| exe_file_allow_write_access(file); | |
| fput(file); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * bprm_open_interpreter - open the interpreter the binary asks for | |
| * @bprm: binary that is being executed | |
| * @path: the interpreter path named in the binary's PT_INTERP | |
| * | |
| * A binfmt_misc loader entry substitutes for the interpreter the binary | |
| * names. Hand out the stashed substitute if there is one and open @path | |
| * if there is not. The caller owns the reference either way and releases | |
| * it like any other open_exec() one. | |
| * | |
| * Return: the interpreter on success, an ERR_PTR on failure | |
| */ | |
| struct file *bprm_open_interpreter(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *path) | |
| { | |
| if (bprm->loader) | |
| return no_free_ptr(bprm->loader); | |
| return open_exec(path); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * bprm_drop_loader - discard a PT_INTERP substitute that does not apply | |
| * @bprm: binary that is being executed | |
| * | |
| * A binary without PT_INTERP has nothing to substitute for, so drop the | |
| * override and let the binary load natively rather than have | |
| * begin_new_exec() refuse it. A no-op once bprm_open_interpreter() took | |
| * the substitute. | |
| */ | |
| void bprm_drop_loader(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| do_close_execat(no_free_ptr(bprm->loader)); | |
| } | |
| static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| if (bprm->mm) { | |
| acct_arg_size(bprm, 0); | |
| mmput(bprm->mm); | |
| } | |
| if (bprm->user_ns) | |
| put_user_ns(bprm->user_ns); | |
| free_arg_pages(bprm); | |
| if (bprm->cred) { | |
| /* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */ | |
| current->fs->in_exec = 0; | |
| mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); | |
| abort_creds(bprm->cred); | |
| } | |
| /* exec swapped the mm but failed before setup_new_exec() freed it */ | |
| if (bprm->old_mm) | |
| exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm); | |
| do_close_execat(bprm->file); | |
| /* An unconsumed PT_INTERP substitute from a binfmt_misc loader entry. */ | |
| bprm_drop_loader(bprm); | |
| do_close_execat(bprm->executable); | |
| /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */ | |
| if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) | |
| kfree(bprm->interp); | |
| kfree(bprm->bpf_interp); | |
| if (bprm->bpf_interp_file) | |
| fput(bprm->bpf_interp_file); | |
| kfree(bprm->bpf_interp_arg); | |
| kfree(bprm->fdpath); | |
| kfree(bprm); | |
| } | |
| static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename, int flags) | |
| { | |
| struct linux_binprm *bprm; | |
| struct file *file; | |
| int retval = -ENOMEM; | |
| file = do_open_execat(fd, filename, flags); | |
| if (IS_ERR(file)) | |
| return ERR_CAST(file); | |
| bprm = kzalloc_obj(*bprm); | |
| if (!bprm) { | |
| do_close_execat(file); | |
| return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
| } | |
| bprm->file = file; | |
| if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') { | |
| bprm->filename = filename->name; | |
| } else { | |
| if (filename->name[0] == '\0') { | |
| bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d", fd); | |
| bprm->comm_from_dentry = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| bprm->fdpath = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "/dev/fd/%d/%s", | |
| fd, filename->name); | |
| } | |
| if (!bprm->fdpath) | |
| goto out_free; | |
| /* | |
| * Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be | |
| * inaccessible after exec. This allows the code in exec to | |
| * choose to fail when the executable is not mmaped into the | |
| * interpreter and an open file descriptor is not passed to | |
| * the interpreter. This makes for a better user experience | |
| * than having the interpreter start and then immediately fail | |
| * when it finds the executable is inaccessible. | |
| */ | |
| if (get_close_on_exec(fd)) | |
| bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE; | |
| bprm->filename = bprm->fdpath; | |
| } | |
| bprm->interp = bprm->filename; | |
| /* | |
| * At this point, security_file_open() has already been called (with | |
| * __FMODE_EXEC) and access control checks for AT_EXECVE_CHECK will | |
| * stop just after the security_bprm_creds_for_exec() call in | |
| * bprm_execve(). Indeed, the kernel should not try to parse the | |
| * content of the file with exec_binprm() nor change the calling | |
| * thread, which means that the following security functions will not | |
| * be called: | |
| * - security_bprm_check() | |
| * - security_bprm_creds_from_file() | |
| * - security_bprm_committing_creds() | |
| * - security_bprm_committed_creds() | |
| */ | |
| bprm->is_check = !!(flags & AT_EXECVE_CHECK); | |
| retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm); | |
| if (!retval) | |
| return bprm; | |
| out_free: | |
| free_bprm(bprm); | |
| return ERR_PTR(retval); | |
| } | |
| DEFINE_CLASS(bprm, struct linux_binprm *, if (!IS_ERR(_T)) free_bprm(_T), | |
| alloc_bprm(fd, name, flags), int fd, struct filename *name, int flags) | |
| int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it first. */ | |
| if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) | |
| kfree(bprm->interp); | |
| bprm->interp = kstrdup(interp, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| if (!bprm->interp) | |
| return -ENOMEM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp); | |
| /* | |
| * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program | |
| * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against | |
| * PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync | |
| */ | |
| static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct task_struct *p = current, *t; | |
| unsigned n_fs; | |
| if (p->ptrace) | |
| bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE; | |
| /* | |
| * This isn't strictly necessary, but it makes it harder for LSMs to | |
| * mess up. | |
| */ | |
| if (task_no_new_privs(current)) | |
| bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS; | |
| /* | |
| * If another task is sharing our fs, we cannot safely | |
| * suid exec because the differently privileged task | |
| * will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc. | |
| * It would be nice to force an unshare instead... | |
| * | |
| * Otherwise we set fs->in_exec = 1 to deny clone(CLONE_FS) | |
| * from another sub-thread until de_thread() succeeds, this | |
| * state is protected by cred_guard_mutex we hold. | |
| */ | |
| n_fs = 1; | |
| read_seqlock_excl(&p->fs->seq); | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| for_other_threads(p, t) { | |
| if (t->fs == p->fs) | |
| n_fs++; | |
| } | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| /* "users" and "in_exec" locked for copy_fs() */ | |
| if (p->fs->users > n_fs) | |
| bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE; | |
| else | |
| p->fs->in_exec = 1; | |
| read_sequnlock_excl(&p->fs->seq); | |
| } | |
| static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) | |
| { | |
| /* Handle suid and sgid on files */ | |
| struct mnt_idmap *idmap; | |
| struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); | |
| unsigned int mode; | |
| vfsuid_t vfsuid; | |
| vfsgid_t vfsgid; | |
| int err; | |
| if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) | |
| return; | |
| if (task_no_new_privs(current)) | |
| return; | |
| mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode); | |
| if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) | |
| return; | |
| idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); | |
| /* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */ | |
| inode_lock(inode); | |
| /* Atomically reload and check mode/uid/gid now that lock held. */ | |
| mode = inode->i_mode; | |
| vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); | |
| vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode); | |
| err = inode_permission(idmap, inode, MAY_EXEC); | |
| inode_unlock(inode); | |
| /* Did the exec bit vanish out from under us? Give up. */ | |
| if (err) | |
| return; | |
| /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ | |
| if (!vfsuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsuid) || | |
| !vfsgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsgid)) | |
| return; | |
| if (mode & S_ISUID) { | |
| bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
| bprm->cred->euid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); | |
| } | |
| if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { | |
| bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
| bprm->cred->egid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary. | |
| */ | |
| static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| /* Compute creds based on which file? */ | |
| struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file; | |
| bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file); | |
| return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. | |
| * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes | |
| * | |
| * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example). | |
| */ | |
| static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| loff_t pos = 0; | |
| memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); | |
| return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p | |
| * points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after | |
| * the first '\0' encountered. | |
| */ | |
| int remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| unsigned long offset; | |
| char *kaddr; | |
| struct page *page; | |
| if (!bprm->argc) | |
| return 0; | |
| do { | |
| offset = bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK; | |
| page = get_arg_page(bprm, bprm->p, 0); | |
| if (!page) | |
| return -EFAULT; | |
| kaddr = kmap_local_page(page); | |
| for (; offset < PAGE_SIZE && kaddr[offset]; | |
| offset++, bprm->p++) | |
| ; | |
| kunmap_local(kaddr); | |
| put_arg_page(page); | |
| } while (offset == PAGE_SIZE); | |
| bprm->p++; | |
| bprm->argc--; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero); | |
| /* | |
| * cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image | |
| */ | |
| static int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| struct linux_binfmt *fmt; | |
| int retval; | |
| retval = prepare_binprm(bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| retval = security_bprm_check(bprm); | |
| if (retval) | |
| return retval; | |
| read_lock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) { | |
| if (!try_module_get(fmt->module)) | |
| continue; | |
| read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm); | |
| read_lock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| put_binfmt(fmt); | |
| if (bprm->point_of_no_return || (retval != -ENOEXEC)) { | |
| read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| return retval; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| read_unlock(&binfmt_lock); | |
| return -ENOEXEC; | |
| } | |
| /* binfmt handlers will call back into begin_new_exec() on success. */ | |
| static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| pid_t old_pid, old_vpid; | |
| int ret, depth; | |
| /* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */ | |
| old_pid = current->pid; | |
| rcu_read_lock(); | |
| old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent)); | |
| rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| /* This allows 5 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */ | |
| for (depth = 0;; depth++) { | |
| struct file *exec; | |
| if (depth > 5) | |
| return -ELOOP; | |
| ret = search_binary_handler(bprm); | |
| if (ret < 0) | |
| return ret; | |
| if (!bprm->interpreter) | |
| break; | |
| /* A stashed PT_INTERP substitute belonged to the replaced file. */ | |
| bprm_drop_loader(bprm); | |
| exec = bprm->file; | |
| bprm->file = bprm->interpreter; | |
| bprm->interpreter = NULL; | |
| if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) { | |
| if (bprm->executable) { | |
| do_close_execat(exec); | |
| return -ENOEXEC; | |
| } | |
| /* Kept for AT_EXECFD; the write denial rides along until hand-over. */ | |
| bprm->executable = exec; | |
| } else { | |
| do_close_execat(exec); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| audit_bprm(bprm); | |
| trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm); | |
| ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid); | |
| proc_exec_connector(current); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
| { | |
| int retval; | |
| retval = prepare_bprm_creds(bprm); | |
| if (retval) | |
| return retval; | |
| /* | |
| * Check for unsafe execution states before exec_binprm(), which | |
| * will call back into begin_new_exec(), into bprm_creds_from_file(), | |
| * where setuid-ness is evaluated. | |
| */ | |
| check_unsafe_exec(bprm); | |
| current->in_execve = 1; | |
| sched_mm_cid_before_execve(current); | |
| sched_exec(); | |
| /* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */ | |
| retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm); | |
| if (retval || bprm->is_check) | |
| goto out; | |
| retval = exec_binprm(bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| goto out; | |
| sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); | |
| rseq_execve(current); | |
| /* execve succeeded */ | |
| current->in_execve = 0; | |
| user_events_execve(current); | |
| acct_update_integrals(current); | |
| task_numa_free(current, false); | |
| return retval; | |
| out: | |
| /* | |
| * If past the point of no return ensure the code never | |
| * returns to the userspace process. Use an existing fatal | |
| * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with | |
| * SIGSEGV. | |
| */ | |
| if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current)) | |
| force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV); | |
| sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); | |
| rseq_force_update(); | |
| current->in_execve = 0; | |
| return retval; | |
| } | |
| static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, | |
| struct user_arg_ptr argv, | |
| struct user_arg_ptr envp, | |
| int flags) | |
| { | |
| int retval; | |
| /* | |
| * We move the actual failure in case of RLIMIT_NPROC excess from | |
| * set*uid() to execve() because too many poorly written programs | |
| * don't check setuid() return code. Here we additionally recheck | |
| * whether NPROC limit is still exceeded. | |
| */ | |
| if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) && | |
| is_rlimit_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) | |
| return -EAGAIN; | |
| /* We're below the limit (still or again), so we don't want to make | |
| * further execve() calls fail. */ | |
| current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; | |
| CLASS(bprm, bprm)(fd, filename, flags); | |
| if (IS_ERR(bprm)) | |
| return PTR_ERR(bprm); | |
| retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->argc = retval; | |
| retval = count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->envc = retval; | |
| retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->exec = bprm->p; | |
| retval = copy_strings(bprm->envc, envp, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| retval = copy_strings(bprm->argc, argv, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| /* | |
| * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to | |
| * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing | |
| * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also | |
| * bprm_stack_limits(). | |
| */ | |
| if (bprm->argc == 0) { | |
| retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->argc = 1; | |
| pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", | |
| current->comm, bprm->filename); | |
| } | |
| return bprm_execve(bprm); | |
| } | |
| int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, | |
| const char *const *argv, const char *const *envp) | |
| { | |
| int retval; | |
| /* It is non-sense for kernel threads to call execve */ | |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| CLASS(filename_kernel, filename)(kernel_filename); | |
| CLASS(bprm, bprm)(AT_FDCWD, filename, 0); | |
| if (IS_ERR(bprm)) | |
| return PTR_ERR(bprm); | |
| retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); | |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) | |
| return -EINVAL; | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->argc = retval; | |
| retval = count_strings_kernel(envp); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->envc = retval; | |
| retval = bprm_stack_limits(bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->filename, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| bprm->exec = bprm->p; | |
| retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->envc, envp, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| retval = copy_strings_kernel(bprm->argc, argv, bprm); | |
| if (retval < 0) | |
| return retval; | |
| return bprm_execve(bprm); | |
| } | |
| void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new) | |
| { | |
| struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
| if (mm->binfmt) | |
| module_put(mm->binfmt->module); | |
| mm->binfmt = new; | |
| if (new) | |
| __module_get(new->module); | |
| } | |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt); | |
| static inline struct user_arg_ptr native_arg(const char __user *const __user *p) | |
| { | |
| return (struct user_arg_ptr){.ptr.native = p}; | |
| } | |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, | |
| const char __user *, filename, | |
| const char __user *const __user *, argv, | |
| const char __user *const __user *, envp) | |
| { | |
| CLASS(filename, name)(filename); | |
| return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, name, | |
| native_arg(argv), native_arg(envp), 0); | |
| } | |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, | |
| int, fd, const char __user *, filename, | |
| const char __user *const __user *, argv, | |
| const char __user *const __user *, envp, | |
| int, flags) | |
| { | |
| CLASS(filename_uflags, name)(filename, flags); | |
| return do_execveat_common(fd, name, | |
| native_arg(argv), native_arg(envp), flags); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT | |
| static inline struct user_arg_ptr compat_arg(const compat_uptr_t __user *p) | |
| { | |
| return (struct user_arg_ptr){.is_compat = true, .ptr.compat = p}; | |
| } | |
| COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename, | |
| const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv, | |
| const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp) | |
| { | |
| CLASS(filename, name)(filename); | |
| return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, name, | |
| compat_arg(argv), compat_arg(envp), 0); | |
| } | |
| COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd, | |
| const char __user *, filename, | |
| const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv, | |
| const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp, | |
| int, flags) | |
| { | |
| CLASS(filename_uflags, name)(filename, flags); | |
| return do_execveat_common(fd, name, | |
| compat_arg(argv), compat_arg(envp), flags); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL | |
| static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, | |
| void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) | |
| { | |
| int error, old = READ_ONCE(suid_dumpable); | |
| error = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); | |
| if (!error && write && (old != READ_ONCE(suid_dumpable))) | |
| validate_coredump_safety(); | |
| return error; | |
| } | |
| static const struct ctl_table fs_exec_sysctls[] = { | |
| { | |
| .procname = "suid_dumpable", | |
| .data = &suid_dumpable, | |
| .maxlen = sizeof(int), | |
| .mode = 0644, | |
| .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump, | |
| .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, | |
| .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO, | |
| }, | |
| }; | |
| static int __init init_fs_exec_sysctls(void) | |
| { | |
| register_sysctl_init("fs", fs_exec_sysctls); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| fs_initcall(init_fs_exec_sysctls); | |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ | |
| #ifdef CONFIG_EXEC_KUNIT_TEST | |
| #include "tests/exec_kunit.c" | |
| #endif |