| .. _securitybugs: | 
 |  | 
 | Security bugs | 
 | ============= | 
 |  | 
 | Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd | 
 | like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and | 
 | disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the | 
 | Linux kernel security team. | 
 |  | 
 | Contact | 
 | ------- | 
 |  | 
 | The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at | 
 | <security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers | 
 | who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. | 
 | If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as | 
 | that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the | 
 | security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to | 
 | understand and fix the security vulnerability. | 
 |  | 
 | As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it | 
 | will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in | 
 | admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what | 
 | information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not | 
 | be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been | 
 | made public. | 
 |  | 
 | Disclosure | 
 | ---------- | 
 |  | 
 | The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the | 
 | bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure.  We prefer | 
 | to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.  It is reasonable to | 
 | delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood, | 
 | the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination.  However, we | 
 | expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months. | 
 | A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the | 
 | bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the kernel security team | 
 | holds the final say when setting a disclosure date.  The timeframe for | 
 | disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known) | 
 | to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to | 
 | disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days. | 
 |  | 
 | Coordination | 
 | ------------ | 
 |  | 
 | Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege | 
 | escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private | 
 | <linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors | 
 | are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the | 
 | upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and | 
 | will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update | 
 | publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, | 
 | the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can | 
 | include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix | 
 | the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: | 
 | <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> | 
 |  | 
 | CVE assignment | 
 | -------------- | 
 |  | 
 | The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them | 
 | for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and | 
 | may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier | 
 | assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private | 
 | linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known | 
 | before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit | 
 | message, though. | 
 |  | 
 | Non-disclosure agreements | 
 | ------------------------- | 
 |  | 
 | The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable | 
 | to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |