|  |  | 
|  | rpcsec_gss support for kernel RPC servers | 
|  | ========================================= | 
|  |  | 
|  | This document gives references to the standards and protocols used to | 
|  | implement RPCGSS authentication in kernel RPC servers such as the NFS | 
|  | server and the NFS client's NFSv4.0 callback server.  (But note that | 
|  | NFSv4.1 and higher don't require the client to act as a server for the | 
|  | purposes of authentication.) | 
|  |  | 
|  | RPCGSS is specified in a few IETF documents: | 
|  | - RFC2203 v1: http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2203.txt | 
|  | - RFC5403 v2: http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5403.txt | 
|  | and there is a 3rd version  being proposed: | 
|  | - http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-williams-rpcsecgssv3.txt | 
|  | (At draft n. 02 at the time of writing) | 
|  |  | 
|  | Background | 
|  | ---------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | The RPCGSS Authentication method describes a way to perform GSSAPI | 
|  | Authentication for NFS.  Although GSSAPI is itself completely mechanism | 
|  | agnostic, in many cases only the KRB5 mechanism is supported by NFS | 
|  | implementations. | 
|  |  | 
|  | The Linux kernel, at the moment, supports only the KRB5 mechanism, and | 
|  | depends on GSSAPI extensions that are KRB5 specific. | 
|  |  | 
|  | GSSAPI is a complex library, and implementing it completely in kernel is | 
|  | unwarranted. However GSSAPI operations are fundementally separable in 2 | 
|  | parts: | 
|  | - initial context establishment | 
|  | - integrity/privacy protection (signing and encrypting of individual | 
|  | packets) | 
|  |  | 
|  | The former is more complex and policy-independent, but less | 
|  | performance-sensitive.  The latter is simpler and needs to be very fast. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Therefore, we perform per-packet integrity and privacy protection in the | 
|  | kernel, but leave the initial context establishment to userspace.  We | 
|  | need upcalls to request userspace to perform context establishment. | 
|  |  | 
|  | NFS Server Legacy Upcall Mechanism | 
|  | ---------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | The classic upcall mechanism uses a custom text based upcall mechanism | 
|  | to talk to a custom daemon called rpc.svcgssd that is provide by the | 
|  | nfs-utils package. | 
|  |  | 
|  | This upcall mechanism has 2 limitations: | 
|  |  | 
|  | A) It can handle tokens that are no bigger than 2KiB | 
|  |  | 
|  | In some Kerberos deployment GSSAPI tokens can be quite big, up and | 
|  | beyond 64KiB in size due to various authorization extensions attacked to | 
|  | the Kerberos tickets, that needs to be sent through the GSS layer in | 
|  | order to perform context establishment. | 
|  |  | 
|  | B) It does not properly handle creds where the user is member of more | 
|  | than a few thousand groups (the current hard limit in the kernel is 65K | 
|  | groups) due to limitation on the size of the buffer that can be send | 
|  | back to the kernel (4KiB). | 
|  |  | 
|  | NFS Server New RPC Upcall Mechanism | 
|  | ----------------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | The newer upcall mechanism uses RPC over a unix socket to a daemon | 
|  | called gss-proxy, implemented by a userspace program called Gssproxy. | 
|  |  | 
|  | The gss_proxy RPC protocol is currently documented here: | 
|  |  | 
|  | https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/wiki/ProtocolDocumentation | 
|  |  | 
|  | This upcall mechanism uses the kernel rpc client and connects to the gssproxy | 
|  | userspace program over a regular unix socket. The gssproxy protocol does not | 
|  | suffer from the size limitations of the legacy protocol. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Negotiating Upcall Mechanisms | 
|  | ----------------------------- | 
|  |  | 
|  | To provide backward compatibility, the kernel defaults to using the | 
|  | legacy mechanism.  To switch to the new mechanism, gss-proxy must bind | 
|  | to /var/run/gssproxy.sock and then write "1" to | 
|  | /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy.  If gss-proxy dies, it must repeat both | 
|  | steps. | 
|  |  | 
|  | Once the upcall mechanism is chosen, it cannot be changed.  To prevent | 
|  | locking into the legacy mechanisms, the above steps must be performed | 
|  | before starting nfsd.  Whoever starts nfsd can guarantee this by reading | 
|  | from /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy and checking that it contains a | 
|  | "1"--the read will block until gss-proxy has done its write to the file. |