blob: c33dd3c299884bf854bec29876f8b29de6be8b87 [file] [log] [blame]
From d661684cf6820331feae71146c35da83d794467e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 11:39:15 -0700
Subject: net: Check the correct namespace when spoofing pid over SCM_RIGHTS
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
commit d661684cf6820331feae71146c35da83d794467e upstream.
This is a security bug.
The follow-up will fix nsproxy to discourage this type of issue from
happening again.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/scm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(st
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
- ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+ ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||