| From 7563cf17dce0a875ba3d872acdc63a78ea344019 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
| From: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> |
| Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 18:38:27 -0500 |
| Subject: libceph: use kernel_connect() |
| |
| From: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> |
| |
| commit 7563cf17dce0a875ba3d872acdc63a78ea344019 upstream. |
| |
| Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when |
| used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to |
| kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side |
| effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with |
| kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to |
| ceph_tcp_connect(). |
| |
| This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree |
| addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect() |
| throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches |
| targeting various trees. |
| |
| Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org |
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@google.com/ |
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/ |
| Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect") |
| Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com> |
| Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> |
| Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> |
| Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
| --- |
| net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++-- |
| 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) |
| |
| --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c |
| +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c |
| @@ -454,8 +454,8 @@ int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_connect |
| set_sock_callbacks(sock, con); |
| |
| con_sock_state_connecting(con); |
| - ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), |
| - O_NONBLOCK); |
| + ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), |
| + O_NONBLOCK); |
| if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { |
| dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n", |
| ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr), |
