blob: 73dbed191f78398178c5e953edc27537ec3e1748 [file] [log] [blame]
From 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 16:15:24 -0500
Subject: ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
commit 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 upstream.
info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index
rmidi->streams.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c
+++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <sound/rawmidi.h>
#include <sound/info.h>
#include <sound/control.h>
@@ -591,6 +592,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(str
return -ENXIO;
if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1)
return -EINVAL;
+ info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2);
pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream];
if (pstr->substream_count == 0)
return -ENOENT;