blob: 30332f454f8f79da7725355dd74519b2560f9d57 [file] [log] [blame]
From foo@baz Sat Apr 29 08:22:13 CEST 2017
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 16:11:21 +0200
Subject: net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b ]
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.
Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.
Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -4247,6 +4247,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
+ if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size > UINT_MAX / req->tp_block_nr))
+ goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;