| From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018 |
| Subject: x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 |
| From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com |
| Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:21 2018 -0800 |
| |
| From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com |
| |
| commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 |
| |
| Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections |
| in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the |
| kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim |
| mitigation for __user pointer de-references. |
| |
| Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> |
| Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> |
| Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
| Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org |
| Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com |
| Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org |
| Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org |
| Cc: alan@linux.intel.com |
| Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com |
| Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
| |
| |
| --- |
| arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- |
| 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) |
| |
| --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |
| +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |
| @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic |
| { |
| if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) |
| return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); |
| - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); |
| + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); |
| } |
| |
| ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, |
