kernel / pub / scm / linux / kernel / git / tsbogend / linux / 4f9b3a377549e2b585f5e1910c247913b49e6c83 / . / crypto / jitterentropy.c

/* | |

* Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter -- | |

* Jitter RNG standalone code. | |

* | |

* Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2015 - 2020 | |

* | |

* Design | |

* ====== | |

* | |

* See http://www.chronox.de/jent.html | |

* | |

* License | |

* ======= | |

* | |

* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |

* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |

* are met: | |

* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |

* notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, | |

* including the disclaimer of warranties. | |

* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |

* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |

* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |

* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote | |

* products derived from this software without specific prior | |

* written permission. | |

* | |

* ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of | |

* the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are | |

* required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is | |

* necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and | |

* the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) | |

* | |

* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED | |

* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES | |

* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF | |

* WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE | |

* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR | |

* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT | |

* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR | |

* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF | |

* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT | |

* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE | |

* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH | |

* DAMAGE. | |

*/ | |

/* | |

* This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library | |

* version 2.2.0 provided at http://www.chronox.de/jent.html | |

*/ | |

#ifdef __OPTIMIZE__ | |

#error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c." | |

#endif | |

typedef unsigned long long __u64; | |

typedef long long __s64; | |

typedef unsigned int __u32; | |

#define NULL ((void *) 0) | |

/* The entropy pool */ | |

struct rand_data { | |

/* all data values that are vital to maintain the security | |

* of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not | |

* access that information while the RNG executes its loops to | |

* calculate the next random value. */ | |

__u64 data; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */ | |

__u64 old_data; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */ | |

__u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */ | |

#define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8) | |

__u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | |

__s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */ | |

unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */ | |

#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64 | |

#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32 | |

#define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128 | |

#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE) | |

unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of | |

* memblocks * memblocksize */ | |

unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */ | |

unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */ | |

unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */ | |

unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random | |

* bit generation */ | |

/* Repetition Count Test */ | |

int rct_count; /* Number of stuck values */ | |

/* Adaptive Proportion Test for a significance level of 2^-30 */ | |

#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF 325 /* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */ | |

#define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE 512 /* Data window size */ | |

/* LSB of time stamp to process */ | |

#define JENT_APT_LSB 16 | |

#define JENT_APT_WORD_MASK (JENT_APT_LSB - 1) | |

unsigned int apt_observations; /* Number of collected observations */ | |

unsigned int apt_count; /* APT counter */ | |

unsigned int apt_base; /* APT base reference */ | |

unsigned int apt_base_set:1; /* APT base reference set? */ | |

unsigned int health_failure:1; /* Permanent health failure */ | |

}; | |

/* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */ | |

#define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more | |

* entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for | |

* entropy collector */ | |

/* -- error codes for init function -- */ | |

#define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */ | |

#define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */ | |

#define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */ | |

#define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of | |

* variations (2nd derivation of time is | |

* zero). */ | |

#define JENT_ESTUCK 8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */ | |

#define JENT_EHEALTH 9 /* Health test failed during initialization */ | |

#define JENT_ERCT 10 /* RCT failed during initialization */ | |

#include "jitterentropy.h" | |

/*************************************************************************** | |

* Adaptive Proportion Test | |

* | |

* This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2. | |

***************************************************************************/ | |

/** | |

* Reset the APT counter | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

*/ | |

static void jent_apt_reset(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | |

{ | |

/* Reset APT counter */ | |

ec->apt_count = 0; | |

ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | |

ec->apt_observations = 0; | |

} | |

/** | |

* Insert a new entropy event into APT | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* @delta_masked [in] Masked time delta to process | |

*/ | |

static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked) | |

{ | |

/* Initialize the base reference */ | |

if (!ec->apt_base_set) { | |

ec->apt_base = delta_masked; | |

ec->apt_base_set = 1; | |

return; | |

} | |

if (delta_masked == ec->apt_base) { | |

ec->apt_count++; | |

if (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) | |

ec->health_failure = 1; | |

} | |

ec->apt_observations++; | |

if (ec->apt_observations >= JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) | |

jent_apt_reset(ec, delta_masked); | |

} | |

/*************************************************************************** | |

* Stuck Test and its use as Repetition Count Test | |

* | |

* The Jitter RNG uses an enhanced version of the Repetition Count Test | |

* (RCT) specified in SP800-90B section 4.4.1. Instead of counting identical | |

* back-to-back values, the input to the RCT is the counting of the stuck | |

* values during the generation of one Jitter RNG output block. | |

* | |

* The RCT is applied with an alpha of 2^{-30} compliant to FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | |

* | |

* During the counting operation, the Jitter RNG always calculates the RCT | |

* cut-off value of C. If that value exceeds the allowed cut-off value, | |

* the Jitter RNG output block will be calculated completely but discarded at | |

* the end. The caller of the Jitter RNG is informed with an error code. | |

***************************************************************************/ | |

/** | |

* Repetition Count Test as defined in SP800-90B section 4.4.1 | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* @stuck [in] Indicator whether the value is stuck | |

*/ | |

static void jent_rct_insert(struct rand_data *ec, int stuck) | |

{ | |

/* | |

* If we have a count less than zero, a previous RCT round identified | |

* a failure. We will not overwrite it. | |

*/ | |

if (ec->rct_count < 0) | |

return; | |

if (stuck) { | |

ec->rct_count++; | |

/* | |

* The cutoff value is based on the following consideration: | |

* alpha = 2^-30 as recommended in FIPS 140-2 IG 9.8. | |

* In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/OSR as this | |

* is the minimum entropy required to provide full entropy. | |

* Note, we collect 64 * OSR deltas for inserting them into | |

* the entropy pool which should then have (close to) 64 bits | |

* of entropy. | |

* | |

* Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo | |

* code of SP800-90B section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence | |

* we need to subtract one from the cutoff value as calculated | |

* following SP800-90B. | |

*/ | |

if ((unsigned int)ec->rct_count >= (31 * ec->osr)) { | |

ec->rct_count = -1; | |

ec->health_failure = 1; | |

} | |

} else { | |

ec->rct_count = 0; | |

} | |

} | |

/** | |

* Is there an RCT health test failure? | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* | |

* @return | |

* 0 No health test failure | |

* 1 Permanent health test failure | |

*/ | |

static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | |

{ | |

if (ec->rct_count < 0) | |

return 1; | |

return 0; | |

} | |

static inline __u64 jent_delta(__u64 prev, __u64 next) | |

{ | |

#define JENT_UINT64_MAX (__u64)(~((__u64) 0)) | |

return (prev < next) ? (next - prev) : | |

(JENT_UINT64_MAX - prev + 1 + next); | |

} | |

/** | |

* Stuck test by checking the: | |

* 1st derivative of the jitter measurement (time delta) | |

* 2nd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) | |

* 3rd derivative of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas) | |

* | |

* All values must always be non-zero. | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* @current_delta [in] Jitter time delta | |

* | |

* @return | |

* 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit) | |

* 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit) | |

*/ | |

static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta) | |

{ | |

__u64 delta2 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta, current_delta); | |

__u64 delta3 = jent_delta(ec->last_delta2, delta2); | |

unsigned int delta_masked = current_delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK; | |

ec->last_delta = current_delta; | |

ec->last_delta2 = delta2; | |

/* | |

* Insert the result of the comparison of two back-to-back time | |

* deltas. | |

*/ | |

jent_apt_insert(ec, delta_masked); | |

if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3) { | |

/* RCT with a stuck bit */ | |

jent_rct_insert(ec, 1); | |

return 1; | |

} | |

/* RCT with a non-stuck bit */ | |

jent_rct_insert(ec, 0); | |

return 0; | |

} | |

/** | |

* Report any health test failures | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* | |

* @return | |

* 0 No health test failure | |

* 1 Permanent health test failure | |

*/ | |

static int jent_health_failure(struct rand_data *ec) | |

{ | |

/* Test is only enabled in FIPS mode */ | |

if (!jent_fips_enabled()) | |

return 0; | |

return ec->health_failure; | |

} | |

/*************************************************************************** | |

* Noise sources | |

***************************************************************************/ | |

/** | |

* Update of the loop count used for the next round of | |

* an entropy collection. | |

* | |

* Input: | |

* @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL | |

* @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider | |

* @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at | |

* the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value | |

* | |

* @return Newly calculated loop counter | |

*/ | |

static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec, | |

unsigned int bits, unsigned int min) | |

{ | |

__u64 time = 0; | |

__u64 shuffle = 0; | |

unsigned int i = 0; | |

unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1; | |

jent_get_nstime(&time); | |

/* | |

* Mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle | |

* calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more. | |

*/ | |

if (ec) | |

time ^= ec->data; | |

/* | |

* We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many | |

* bits of the time stamp are included as possible. | |

*/ | |

for (i = 0; ((DATA_SIZE_BITS + bits - 1) / bits) > i; i++) { | |

shuffle ^= time & mask; | |

time = time >> bits; | |

} | |

/* | |

* We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum | |

* RNG loop count. | |

*/ | |

return (shuffle + (1<<min)); | |

} | |

/** | |

* CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU | |

* execution time jitter | |

* | |

* This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the | |

* entropy pool using an LFSR. | |

* | |

* The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting | |

* and shall stay that way. This function is the root cause why the code | |

* shall be compiled without optimization. This function not only acts as | |

* folding operation, but this function's execution is used to measure | |

* the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in this function | |

* implies that careful retesting must be done. | |

* | |

* @ec [in] entropy collector struct | |

* @time [in] time stamp to be injected | |

* @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as | |

* number of loops to perform the folding | |

* @stuck [in] Is the time stamp identified as stuck? | |

* | |

* Output: | |

* updated ec->data | |

* | |

* @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed | |

*/ | |

static void jent_lfsr_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time, __u64 loop_cnt, | |

int stuck) | |

{ | |

unsigned int i; | |

__u64 j = 0; | |

__u64 new = 0; | |

#define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4 | |

#define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0 | |

__u64 fold_loop_cnt = | |

jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT); | |

/* | |

* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | |

* needed during runtime | |

*/ | |

if (loop_cnt) | |

fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | |

for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) { | |

new = ec->data; | |

for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) { | |

__u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i); | |

tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1); | |

/* | |

* Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of | |

* x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is | |

* primitive according to | |

* http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf | |

* (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one | |

* due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current | |

* position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs | |

* to shift data in from the left without wrap. | |

*/ | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 63) & 1); | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 60) & 1); | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 55) & 1); | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 30) & 1); | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 27) & 1); | |

tmp ^= ((new >> 22) & 1); | |

new <<= 1; | |

new ^= tmp; | |

} | |

} | |

/* | |

* If the time stamp is stuck, do not finally insert the value into | |

* the entropy pool. Although this operation should not do any harm | |

* even when the time stamp has no entropy, SP800-90B requires that | |

* any conditioning operation (SP800-90B considers the LFSR to be a | |

* conditioning operation) to have an identical amount of input | |

* data according to section 3.1.5. | |

*/ | |

if (!stuck) | |

ec->data = new; | |

} | |

/** | |

* Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in | |

* memory access times | |

* | |

* This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing | |

* variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be | |

* added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 | |

* caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. | |

* | |

* The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually | |

* slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal | |

* variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant | |

* variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more | |

* and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses. | |

* L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However, | |

* to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite | |

* large which is usually not desirable. | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if | |

* the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise | |

* source is disabled | |

* @loop_cnt [in] if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value | |

* number of loops to perform the LFSR | |

*/ | |

static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt) | |

{ | |

unsigned int wrap = 0; | |

__u64 i = 0; | |

#define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7 | |

#define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0 | |

__u64 acc_loop_cnt = | |

jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT); | |

if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem) | |

return; | |

wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks; | |

/* | |

* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not | |

* needed during runtime | |

*/ | |

if (loop_cnt) | |

acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt; | |

for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) { | |

unsigned char *tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation; | |

/* | |

* memory access: just add 1 to one byte, | |

* wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read | |

* from and write to memory location | |

*/ | |

*tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff; | |

/* | |

* Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer | |

* with wrap around logic to ensure that every | |

* memory location is hit evenly | |

*/ | |

ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1; | |

ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap; | |

} | |

} | |

/*************************************************************************** | |

* Start of entropy processing logic | |

***************************************************************************/ | |

/** | |

* This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and | |

* use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the | |

* entropy pool. | |

* | |

* WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output | |

* of this function! This can be done by calling this function | |

* and not using its result. | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* | |

* @return result of stuck test | |

*/ | |

static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec) | |

{ | |

__u64 time = 0; | |

__u64 current_delta = 0; | |

int stuck; | |

/* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */ | |

jent_memaccess(ec, 0); | |

/* | |

* Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous | |

* invocation to measure the timing variations | |

*/ | |

jent_get_nstime(&time); | |

current_delta = jent_delta(ec->prev_time, time); | |

ec->prev_time = time; | |

/* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. */ | |

stuck = jent_stuck(ec, current_delta); | |

/* Now call the next noise sources which also injects the data */ | |

jent_lfsr_time(ec, current_delta, 0, stuck); | |

return stuck; | |

} | |

/** | |

* Generator of one 64 bit random number | |

* Function fills rand_data->data | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

*/ | |

static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec) | |

{ | |

unsigned int k = 0; | |

/* priming of the ->prev_time value */ | |

jent_measure_jitter(ec); | |

while (1) { | |

/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */ | |

if (jent_measure_jitter(ec)) | |

continue; | |

/* | |

* We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the | |

* oversampling rate requested by the caller | |

*/ | |

if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr)) | |

break; | |

} | |

} | |

/** | |

* Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller. | |

* | |

* This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate | |

* as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic | |

* creates 64 bit per invocation. | |

* | |

* This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact | |

* size specified by the caller. | |

* | |

* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector | |

* @data [in] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already | |

* exist | |

* @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random | |

* in bytes | |

* | |

* @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error | |

* | |

* The following error codes can occur: | |

* -1 entropy_collector is NULL | |

* -2 RCT failed | |

* -3 APT test failed | |

*/ | |

int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data, | |

unsigned int len) | |

{ | |

unsigned char *p = data; | |

if (!ec) | |

return -1; | |

while (0 < len) { | |

unsigned int tocopy; | |

jent_gen_entropy(ec); | |

if (jent_health_failure(ec)) { | |

int ret; | |

if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) | |

ret = -2; | |

else | |

ret = -3; | |

/* | |

* Re-initialize the noise source | |

* | |

* If the health test fails, the Jitter RNG remains | |

* in failure state and will return a health failure | |

* during next invocation. | |

*/ | |

if (jent_entropy_init()) | |

return ret; | |

/* Set APT to initial state */ | |

jent_apt_reset(ec, 0); | |

ec->apt_base_set = 0; | |

/* Set RCT to initial state */ | |

ec->rct_count = 0; | |

/* Re-enable Jitter RNG */ | |

ec->health_failure = 0; | |

/* | |

* Return the health test failure status to the | |

* caller as the generated value is not appropriate. | |

*/ | |

return ret; | |

} | |

if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len) | |

tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8); | |

else | |

tocopy = len; | |

jent_memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy); | |

len -= tocopy; | |

p += tocopy; | |

} | |

return 0; | |

} | |

/*************************************************************************** | |

* Initialization logic | |

***************************************************************************/ | |

struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr, | |

unsigned int flags) | |

{ | |

struct rand_data *entropy_collector; | |

entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data)); | |

if (!entropy_collector) | |

return NULL; | |

if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) { | |

/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory | |

* access | |

*/ | |

entropy_collector->mem = jent_zalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE); | |

if (!entropy_collector->mem) { | |

jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | |

return NULL; | |

} | |

entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; | |

entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS; | |

entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS; | |

} | |

/* verify and set the oversampling rate */ | |

if (0 == osr) | |

osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */ | |

entropy_collector->osr = osr; | |

/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */ | |

jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector); | |

return entropy_collector; | |

} | |

void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector) | |

{ | |

jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem); | |

entropy_collector->mem = NULL; | |

jent_zfree(entropy_collector); | |

} | |

int jent_entropy_init(void) | |

{ | |

int i; | |

__u64 delta_sum = 0; | |

__u64 old_delta = 0; | |

unsigned int nonstuck = 0; | |

int time_backwards = 0; | |

int count_mod = 0; | |

int count_stuck = 0; | |

struct rand_data ec = { 0 }; | |

/* Required for RCT */ | |

ec.osr = 1; | |

/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is | |

* that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These | |

* loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce | |

* false positives. | |

* | |

* Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic | |

* jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But | |

* the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely | |

* used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus, | |

* no statistical tests. | |

*/ | |

/* | |

* We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or | |

* check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the | |

* following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution | |

* timer. | |

*/ | |

/* | |

* TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is | |

* definitely too little. | |

* | |

* SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles. | |

*/ | |

#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024 | |

#define CLEARCACHE 100 | |

for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) { | |

__u64 time = 0; | |

__u64 time2 = 0; | |

__u64 delta = 0; | |

unsigned int lowdelta = 0; | |

int stuck; | |

/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */ | |

jent_get_nstime(&time); | |

ec.prev_time = time; | |

jent_lfsr_time(&ec, time, 0, 0); | |

jent_get_nstime(&time2); | |

/* test whether timer works */ | |

if (!time || !time2) | |

return JENT_ENOTIME; | |

delta = jent_delta(time, time2); | |

/* | |

* test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide | |

* delta even when called shortly after each other -- this | |

* implies that we also have a high resolution timer | |

*/ | |

if (!delta) | |

return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | |

stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta); | |

/* | |

* up to here we did not modify any variable that will be | |

* evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we | |

* already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, | |

* etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case | |

* measurements. | |

*/ | |

if (CLEARCACHE > i) | |

continue; | |

if (stuck) | |

count_stuck++; | |

else { | |

nonstuck++; | |

/* | |

* Ensure that the APT succeeded. | |

* | |

* With the check below that count_stuck must be less | |

* than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values | |

* it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at | |

* floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times. | |

*/ | |

if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) { | |

jent_apt_reset(&ec, | |

delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK); | |

if (jent_health_failure(&ec)) | |

return JENT_EHEALTH; | |

} | |

} | |

/* Validate RCT */ | |

if (jent_rct_failure(&ec)) | |

return JENT_ERCT; | |

/* test whether we have an increasing timer */ | |

if (!(time2 > time)) | |

time_backwards++; | |

/* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */ | |

lowdelta = time2 - time; | |

if (!(lowdelta % 100)) | |

count_mod++; | |

/* | |

* ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary | |

* for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check | |

* only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime | |

* the old_data value | |

*/ | |

if (delta > old_delta) | |

delta_sum += (delta - old_delta); | |

else | |

delta_sum += (old_delta - delta); | |

old_delta = delta; | |

} | |

/* | |

* we allow up to three times the time running backwards. | |

* CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus, | |

* if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it | |

* should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being | |

* performed during our test run. | |

*/ | |

if (3 < time_backwards) | |

return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC; | |

/* | |

* Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger | |

* than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation | |

* implied with 1 is preserved | |

*/ | |

if ((delta_sum) <= 1) | |

return JENT_EVARVAR; | |

/* | |

* Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at | |

* least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments | |

* in multiples of 100, but not always | |

*/ | |

if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod) | |

return JENT_ECOARSETIME; | |

/* | |

* If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is | |

* likely to not work well. | |

*/ | |

if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck) | |

return JENT_ESTUCK; | |

return 0; | |

} |