cve/published/2021/CVE-2021-47275.mbox

From bippy-5f407fcff5a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: <linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org>
Reply-to: <cve@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2021-47275: bcache: avoid oversized read request in cache missing code path

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bcache: avoid oversized read request in cache missing code path

In the cache missing code path of cached device, if a proper location
from the internal B+ tree is matched for a cache miss range, function
cached_dev_cache_miss() will be called in cache_lookup_fn() in the
following code block,
[code block 1]
  526         unsigned int sectors = KEY_INODE(k) == s->iop.inode
  527                 ? min_t(uint64_t, INT_MAX,
  528                         KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector)
  529                 : INT_MAX;
  530         int ret = s->d->cache_miss(b, s, bio, sectors);

Here s->d->cache_miss() is the call backfunction pointer initialized as
cached_dev_cache_miss(), the last parameter 'sectors' is an important
hint to calculate the size of read request to backing device of the
missing cache data.

Current calculation in above code block may generate oversized value of
'sectors', which consequently may trigger 2 different potential kernel
panics by BUG() or BUG_ON() as listed below,

1) BUG_ON() inside bch_btree_insert_key(),
[code block 2]
   886         BUG_ON(b->ops->is_extents && !KEY_SIZE(k));
2) BUG() inside biovec_slab(),
[code block 3]
   51         default:
   52                 BUG();
   53                 return NULL;

All the above panics are original from cached_dev_cache_miss() by the
oversized parameter 'sectors'.

Inside cached_dev_cache_miss(), parameter 'sectors' is used to calculate
the size of data read from backing device for the cache missing. This
size is stored in s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 4]
  909    s->insert_bio_sectors = min(sectors, bio_sectors(bio) + reada);

Then the actual key inserting to the internal B+ tree is generated and
stored in s->iop.replace_key by the following lines of code,
[code block 5]
  911   s->iop.replace_key = KEY(s->iop.inode,
  912                    bio->bi_iter.bi_sector + s->insert_bio_sectors,
  913                    s->insert_bio_sectors);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 1) by BUG_ON() from
the above code block.

And the bio sending to backing device for the missing data is allocated
with hint from s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 6]
  926    cache_bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOWAIT,
  927                 DIV_ROUND_UP(s->insert_bio_sectors, PAGE_SECTORS),
  928                 &dc->disk.bio_split);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 2) by BUG() from the
agove code block.

Now let me explain how the panics happen with the oversized 'sectors'.
In code block 5, replace_key is generated by macro KEY(). From the
definition of macro KEY(),
[code block 7]
  71 #define KEY(inode, offset, size)                                  \
  72 ((struct bkey) {                                                  \
  73      .high = (1ULL << 63) | ((__u64) (size) << 20) | (inode),     \
  74      .low = (offset)                                              \
  75 })

Here 'size' is 16bits width embedded in 64bits member 'high' of struct
bkey. But in code block 1, if "KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector" is
very probably to be larger than (1<<16) - 1, which makes the bkey size
calculation in code block 5 is overflowed. In one bug report the value
of parameter 'sectors' is 131072 (= 1 << 17), the overflowed 'sectors'
results the overflowed s->insert_bio_sectors in code block 4, then makes
size field of s->iop.replace_key to be 0 in code block 5. Then the 0-
sized s->iop.replace_key is inserted into the internal B+ tree as cache
missing check key (a special key to detect and avoid a racing between
normal write request and cache missing read request) as,
[code block 8]
  915   ret = bch_btree_insert_check_key(b, &s->op, &s->iop.replace_key);

Then the 0-sized s->iop.replace_key as 3rd parameter triggers the bkey
size check BUG_ON() in code block 2, and causes the kernel panic 1).

Another kernel panic is from code block 6, is by the bvecs number
oversized value s->insert_bio_sectors from code block 4,
        min(sectors, bio_sectors(bio) + reada)
There are two possibility for oversized reresult,
- bio_sectors(bio) is valid, but bio_sectors(bio) + reada is oversized.
- sectors < bio_sectors(bio) + reada, but sectors is oversized.

From a bug report the result of "DIV_ROUND_UP(s->insert_bio_sectors,
PAGE_SECTORS)" from code block 6 can be 344, 282, 946, 342 and many
other values which larther than BIO_MAX_VECS (a.k.a 256). When calling
bio_alloc_bioset() with such larger-than-256 value as the 2nd parameter,
this value will eventually be sent to biovec_slab() as parameter
'nr_vecs' in following code path,
   bio_alloc_bioset() ==> bvec_alloc() ==> biovec_slab()
Because parameter 'nr_vecs' is larger-than-256 value, the panic by BUG()
in code block 3 is triggered inside biovec_slab().

From the above analysis, we know that the 4th parameter 'sector' sent
into cached_dev_cache_miss() may cause overflow in code block 5 and 6,
and finally cause kernel panic in code block 2 and 3. And if result of
bio_sectors(bio) + reada exceeds valid bvecs number, it may also trigger
kernel panic in code block 3 from code block 6.

Now the almost-useless readahead size for cache missing request back to
backing device is removed, this patch can fix the oversized issue with
more simpler method.
- add a local variable size_limit,  set it by the minimum value from
  the max bkey size and max bio bvecs number.
- set s->insert_bio_sectors by the minimum value from size_limit,
  sectors, and the sectors size of bio.
- replace sectors by s->insert_bio_sectors to do bio_next_split.

By the above method with size_limit, s->insert_bio_sectors will never
result oversized replace_key size or bio bvecs number. And split bio
'miss' from bio_next_split() will always match the size of 'cache_bio',
that is the current maximum bio size we can sent to backing device for
fetching the cache missing data.

Current problmatic code can be partially found since Linux v3.13-rc1,
therefore all maintained stable kernels should try to apply this fix.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2021-47275 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 5.12.11 with commit 555002a840ab88468e252b0eedf0b05e2ce7099c
	Fixed in 5.13 with commit 41fe8d088e96472f63164e213de44ec77be69478

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2021-47275
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/md/bcache/request.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/555002a840ab88468e252b0eedf0b05e2ce7099c
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41fe8d088e96472f63164e213de44ec77be69478