blob: 25ed205442cb603c8d0de106857029d3758ed55f [file] [log] [blame]
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "f4215fc3-5b6b-47ff-a258-f7189bd81038"
},
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers\n\nThere are two skb pointers to manage tx skb's enqueued from n/w stack.\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which needs to be processed\nand ongoing_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which is being processed.\n\nSPI thread prepares the tx data chunks from the tx skb pointed by the\nongoing_tx_skb pointer. When the tx skb pointed by the ongoing_tx_skb is\nprocessed, the tx skb pointed by the waiting_tx_skb is assigned to\nongoing_tx_skb and the waiting_tx_skb pointer is assigned with NULL.\nWhenever there is a new tx skb from n/w stack, it will be assigned to\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer if it is NULL. Enqueuing and processing of a tx skb\nhandled in two different threads.\n\nConsider a scenario where the SPI thread processed an ongoing_tx_skb and\nit moves next tx skb from waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer\nwithout doing any NULL check. At this time, if the waiting_tx_skb pointer\nis NULL then ongoing_tx_skb pointer is also assigned with NULL. After\nthat, if a new tx skb is assigned to waiting_tx_skb pointer by the n/w\nstack and there is a chance to overwrite the tx skb pointer with NULL in\nthe SPI thread. Finally one of the tx skb will be left as unhandled,\nresulting packet missing and memory leak.\n\n- Consider the below scenario where the TXC reported from the previous\ntransfer is 10 and ongoing_tx_skb holds an tx ethernet frame which can be\ntransported in 20 TXCs and waiting_tx_skb is still NULL.\n\ttx_credits = 10; /* 21 are filled in the previous transfer */\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 20;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true.\n- After oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- Perform SPI transfer.\n- Process SPI rx buffer to get the TXC from footers.\n- Now let's assume previously filled 21 TXCs are freed so we are good to\ntransport the next remaining 10 tx chunks from ongoing_tx_skb.\n\ttx_credits = 21;\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true again.\n- In the oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = NULL;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n\n- Now the below bad case might happen,\n\nThread1 (oa_tc6_start_xmit)\tThread2 (oa_tc6_spi_thread_handler)\n---------------------------\t-----------------------------------\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- if ongoing_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = waiting_tx_skb\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\t\t\t\t- waiting_tx_skb = NULL\n\t\t\t\t...\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = NULL\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\nTo overcome the above issue, protect the moving of tx skb reference from\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer and assigning new tx skb\nto waiting_tx_skb pointer, so that the other thread can't access the\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer until the current thread completes moving the tx\nskb reference safely."
}
],
"affected": [
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/oa_tc6.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a",
"lessThan": "1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"version": "53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a",
"lessThan": "e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f",
"status": "affected",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"product": "Linux",
"vendor": "Linux",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/oa_tc6.c"
],
"versions": [
{
"version": "6.12",
"status": "affected"
},
{
"version": "0",
"lessThan": "6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "6.12.7",
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"version": "6.13",
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"operator": "OR",
"negate": false,
"cpeMatch": [
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.12",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.7"
},
{
"vulnerable": true,
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.12",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.13"
}
]
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f"
}
],
"title": "net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "f4215fc3-5b6b-47ff-a258-f7189bd81038",
"cveID": "CVE-2024-56788",
"requesterUserId": "gregkh@kernel.org",
"serial": "1",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.0"
}