| From bippy-5f407fcff5a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
| From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
| To: <linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org> |
| Reply-to: <cve@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> |
| Subject: CVE-2023-53024: bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation |
| |
| Description |
| =========== |
| |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: |
| |
| bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation |
| |
| To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to |
| insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence |
| instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a |
| pointer to the stack. |
| |
| However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first |
| initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then |
| overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because |
| the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write |
| may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a |
| speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the |
| program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, |
| for example, a branch-based cache side channel. |
| |
| To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot |
| that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills |
| are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance |
| impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small. |
| |
| The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit |
| and the mitigation: |
| |
| [...] |
| // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input) |
| // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel |
| // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked |
| // |
| r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb |
| *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked |
| // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack. |
| // |
| // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor |
| // for no r9-r10 dependency. |
| // |
| *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr |
| // 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID, |
| // store may be subject to SSB |
| // |
| // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr |
| // |
| r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) |
| // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr |
| // |
| // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel: |
| r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak |
| if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict |
| // architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0, |
| // only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1 |
| r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast) |
| SLOW: |
| [...] |
| |
| After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to |
| determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64 |
| times to recover the whole address on amd64. |
| |
| In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is |
| overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative |
| store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer |
| bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless |
| logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on |
| pointer arithmetic") for details. |
| |
| Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks} |
| because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled. |
| For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable |
| while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address |
| into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged |
| processes. |
| |
| The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-53024 to this issue. |
| |
| |
| Affected and fixed versions |
| =========================== |
| |
| Issue introduced in 4.19.207 with commit 872968502114d68c21419cf7eb5ab97717e7b803 and fixed in 4.19.272 with commit aae109414a57ab4164218f36e2e4a17f027fcaaa |
| Issue introduced in 5.4.146 with commit f5893af2704eb763eb982f01d573f5b19f06b623 and fixed in 5.4.231 with commit 81b3374944d201872cfcf82730a7860f8e7c31dd |
| Issue introduced in 5.10.56 with commit 0e9280654aa482088ee6ef3deadef331f5ac5fb0 and fixed in 5.10.166 with commit da75dec7c6617bddad418159ffebcb133f008262 |
| Issue introduced in 5.14 with commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee and fixed in 5.15.91 with commit 01bdcc73dbe7be3ad4d4ee9a59b71e42f461a528 |
| Issue introduced in 5.14 with commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee and fixed in 6.1.9 with commit b0c89ef025562161242a7c19b213bd6b272e93df |
| Issue introduced in 5.14 with commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee and fixed in 6.2 with commit e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6 |
| Issue introduced in 5.13.8 with commit 0b27bdf02c400684225ee5ee99970bcbf5082282 |
| |
| Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported |
| kernel versions by the kernel community. |
| |
| Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to |
| older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at |
| https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-53024 |
| will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most |
| up to date information about this issue. |
| |
| |
| Affected files |
| ============== |
| |
| The file(s) affected by this issue are: |
| kernel/bpf/verifier.c |
| |
| |
| Mitigation |
| ========== |
| |
| The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest |
| stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual |
| changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel |
| release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or |
| supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to |
| the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this |
| issue can be found at these commits: |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aae109414a57ab4164218f36e2e4a17f027fcaaa |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81b3374944d201872cfcf82730a7860f8e7c31dd |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da75dec7c6617bddad418159ffebcb133f008262 |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01bdcc73dbe7be3ad4d4ee9a59b71e42f461a528 |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0c89ef025562161242a7c19b213bd6b272e93df |
| https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6 |