| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 | |
| /* | |
| * Copyright 2019 Google LLC | |
| */ | |
| /* | |
| * Refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst for detailed explanation. | |
| */ | |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto-fallback: " fmt | |
| #include <crypto/skcipher.h> | |
| #include <linux/blk-crypto.h> | |
| #include <linux/blk-crypto-profile.h> | |
| #include <linux/blkdev.h> | |
| #include <linux/crypto.h> | |
| #include <linux/mempool.h> | |
| #include <linux/module.h> | |
| #include <linux/random.h> | |
| #include <linux/scatterlist.h> | |
| #include "blk-cgroup.h" | |
| #include "blk-crypto-internal.h" | |
| static unsigned int num_prealloc_bounce_pg = BIO_MAX_VECS; | |
| module_param(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, uint, 0); | |
| MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, | |
| "Number of preallocated bounce pages for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback"); | |
| static unsigned int blk_crypto_num_keyslots = 100; | |
| module_param_named(num_keyslots, blk_crypto_num_keyslots, uint, 0); | |
| MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_keyslots, | |
| "Number of keyslots for the blk-crypto crypto API fallback"); | |
| static unsigned int num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs = 128; | |
| module_param(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs, uint, 0); | |
| MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_fallback_ctxs, | |
| "Number of preallocated bio fallback crypto contexts for blk-crypto to use during crypto API fallback"); | |
| struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx { | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx crypt_ctx; | |
| /* | |
| * Copy of the bvec_iter when this bio was submitted. | |
| * We only want to en/decrypt the part of the bio as described by the | |
| * bvec_iter upon submission because bio might be split before being | |
| * resubmitted | |
| */ | |
| struct bvec_iter crypt_iter; | |
| union { | |
| struct { | |
| struct work_struct work; | |
| struct bio *bio; | |
| }; | |
| struct { | |
| void *bi_private_orig; | |
| bio_end_io_t *bi_end_io_orig; | |
| }; | |
| }; | |
| }; | |
| static struct kmem_cache *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache; | |
| static mempool_t *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool; | |
| /* | |
| * Allocating a crypto tfm during I/O can deadlock, so we have to preallocate | |
| * all of a mode's tfms when that mode starts being used. Since each mode may | |
| * need all the keyslots at some point, each mode needs its own tfm for each | |
| * keyslot; thus, a keyslot may contain tfms for multiple modes. However, to | |
| * match the behavior of real inline encryption hardware (which only supports a | |
| * single encryption context per keyslot), we only allow one tfm per keyslot to | |
| * be used at a time - the rest of the unused tfms have their keys cleared. | |
| */ | |
| static DEFINE_MUTEX(tfms_init_lock); | |
| static bool tfms_inited[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; | |
| static struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot { | |
| enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode; | |
| struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; | |
| } *blk_crypto_keyslots; | |
| static struct blk_crypto_profile *blk_crypto_fallback_profile; | |
| static struct workqueue_struct *blk_crypto_wq; | |
| static mempool_t *blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool; | |
| static struct bio_set enc_bio_set; | |
| /* | |
| * This is the key we set when evicting a keyslot. This *should* be the all 0's | |
| * key, but AES-XTS rejects that key, so we use some random bytes instead. | |
| */ | |
| static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE]; | |
| static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot) | |
| { | |
| struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; | |
| enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode; | |
| int err; | |
| WARN_ON(slotp->crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID); | |
| /* Clear the key in the skcipher */ | |
| err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], blank_key, | |
| blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode].keysize); | |
| WARN_ON(err); | |
| slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| static int | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, | |
| const struct blk_crypto_key *key, | |
| unsigned int slot) | |
| { | |
| struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; | |
| const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = | |
| key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode; | |
| int err; | |
| if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode && | |
| slotp->crypto_mode != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); | |
| slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode; | |
| err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->bytes, | |
| key->size); | |
| if (err) { | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, | |
| const struct blk_crypto_key *key, | |
| unsigned int slot) | |
| { | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops = { | |
| .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program, | |
| .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict, | |
| }; | |
| static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio) | |
| { | |
| struct bio *src_bio = enc_bio->bi_private; | |
| struct page **pages = (struct page **)enc_bio->bi_io_vec; | |
| struct bio_vec *bv; | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| /* | |
| * Use the same trick as the alloc side to avoid the need for an extra | |
| * pages array. | |
| */ | |
| bio_for_each_bvec_all(bv, enc_bio, i) | |
| pages[i] = bv->bv_page; | |
| i = mempool_free_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, (void **)pages, | |
| enc_bio->bi_vcnt); | |
| if (i < enc_bio->bi_vcnt) | |
| release_pages(pages + i, enc_bio->bi_vcnt - i); | |
| if (enc_bio->bi_status) | |
| cmpxchg(&src_bio->bi_status, 0, enc_bio->bi_status); | |
| bio_put(enc_bio); | |
| bio_endio(src_bio); | |
| } | |
| #define PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC (sizeof(struct bio_vec) / sizeof(struct page *)) | |
| static struct bio *blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(struct bio *bio_src, | |
| unsigned int nr_segs, struct page ***pages_ret) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int memflags = memalloc_noio_save(); | |
| unsigned int nr_allocated; | |
| struct page **pages; | |
| struct bio *bio; | |
| bio = bio_alloc_bioset(bio_src->bi_bdev, nr_segs, bio_src->bi_opf, | |
| GFP_NOIO, &enc_bio_set); | |
| if (bio_flagged(bio_src, BIO_REMAPPED)) | |
| bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_REMAPPED); | |
| bio->bi_private = bio_src; | |
| bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio; | |
| bio->bi_ioprio = bio_src->bi_ioprio; | |
| bio->bi_write_hint = bio_src->bi_write_hint; | |
| bio->bi_write_stream = bio_src->bi_write_stream; | |
| bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = bio_src->bi_iter.bi_sector; | |
| bio_clone_blkg_association(bio, bio_src); | |
| /* | |
| * Move page array up in the allocated memory for the bio vecs as far as | |
| * possible so that we can start filling biovecs from the beginning | |
| * without overwriting the temporary page array. | |
| */ | |
| static_assert(PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC > 1); | |
| pages = (struct page **)bio->bi_io_vec; | |
| pages += nr_segs * (PAGE_PTRS_PER_BVEC - 1); | |
| /* | |
| * Try a bulk allocation first. This might not fill all allocated | |
| * pages, but we'll fix that up later in mempool_alloc_bulk. | |
| * | |
| * Note: alloc_pages_bulk needs the array to be zeroed, as it assumes | |
| * any non-zero slot already contains a valid allocation. | |
| */ | |
| memset(pages, 0, sizeof(struct page *) * nr_segs); | |
| nr_allocated = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_segs, pages); | |
| if (nr_allocated < nr_segs) | |
| mempool_alloc_bulk(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool, | |
| (void **)pages + nr_allocated, | |
| nr_segs - nr_allocated); | |
| memalloc_noio_restore(memflags); | |
| *pages_ret = pages; | |
| return bio; | |
| } | |
| static struct crypto_sync_skcipher * | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot) | |
| { | |
| const struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = | |
| &blk_crypto_keyslots[blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)]; | |
| return slotp->tfms[slotp->crypto_mode]; | |
| } | |
| union blk_crypto_iv { | |
| __le64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; | |
| u8 bytes[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE]; | |
| }; | |
| static void blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE], | |
| union blk_crypto_iv *iv) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) | |
| iv->dun[i] = cpu_to_le64(dun[i]); | |
| } | |
| static void __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio, | |
| struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm) | |
| { | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context; | |
| int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size; | |
| SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm); | |
| u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; | |
| struct scatterlist src, dst; | |
| union blk_crypto_iv iv; | |
| unsigned int nr_enc_pages, enc_idx; | |
| struct page **enc_pages; | |
| struct bio *enc_bio; | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req, | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, | |
| NULL, NULL); | |
| memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun)); | |
| sg_init_table(&src, 1); | |
| sg_init_table(&dst, 1); | |
| skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &src, &dst, data_unit_size, | |
| iv.bytes); | |
| /* | |
| * Encrypt each page in the source bio. Because the source bio could | |
| * have bio_vecs that span more than a single page, but the encrypted | |
| * bios are limited to a single page per bio_vec, this can generate | |
| * more than a single encrypted bio per source bio. | |
| */ | |
| new_bio: | |
| nr_enc_pages = min(bio_segments(src_bio), BIO_MAX_VECS); | |
| enc_bio = blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio(src_bio, nr_enc_pages, &enc_pages); | |
| enc_idx = 0; | |
| for (;;) { | |
| struct bio_vec src_bv = | |
| bio_iter_iovec(src_bio, src_bio->bi_iter); | |
| struct page *enc_page = enc_pages[enc_idx]; | |
| if (!IS_ALIGNED(src_bv.bv_len | src_bv.bv_offset, | |
| data_unit_size)) { | |
| enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_INVAL; | |
| goto out_free_enc_bio; | |
| } | |
| __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_page, src_bv.bv_len, | |
| src_bv.bv_offset); | |
| sg_set_page(&src, src_bv.bv_page, data_unit_size, | |
| src_bv.bv_offset); | |
| sg_set_page(&dst, enc_page, data_unit_size, src_bv.bv_offset); | |
| /* | |
| * Increment the index now that the encrypted page is added to | |
| * the bio. This is important for the error unwind path. | |
| */ | |
| enc_idx++; | |
| /* | |
| * Encrypt each data unit in this page. | |
| */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < src_bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) { | |
| blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv); | |
| if (crypto_skcipher_encrypt(ciph_req)) { | |
| enc_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR; | |
| goto out_free_enc_bio; | |
| } | |
| bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1); | |
| src.offset += data_unit_size; | |
| dst.offset += data_unit_size; | |
| } | |
| bio_advance_iter_single(src_bio, &src_bio->bi_iter, | |
| src_bv.bv_len); | |
| if (!src_bio->bi_iter.bi_size) | |
| break; | |
| if (enc_idx == nr_enc_pages) { | |
| /* | |
| * For each additional encrypted bio submitted, | |
| * increment the source bio's remaining count. Each | |
| * encrypted bio's completion handler calls bio_endio on | |
| * the source bio, so this keeps the source bio from | |
| * completing until the last encrypted bio does. | |
| */ | |
| bio_inc_remaining(src_bio); | |
| submit_bio(enc_bio); | |
| goto new_bio; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| submit_bio(enc_bio); | |
| return; | |
| out_free_enc_bio: | |
| /* | |
| * Add the remaining pages to the bio so that the normal completion path | |
| * in blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio frees them. The exact data | |
| * layout does not matter for that, so don't bother iterating the source | |
| * bio. | |
| */ | |
| for (; enc_idx < nr_enc_pages; enc_idx++) | |
| __bio_add_page(enc_bio, enc_pages[enc_idx], PAGE_SIZE, 0); | |
| bio_endio(enc_bio); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The crypto API fallback's encryption routine. | |
| * | |
| * Allocate one or more bios for encryption, encrypt the input bio using the | |
| * crypto API, and submit the encrypted bios. Sets bio->bi_status and | |
| * completes the source bio on error | |
| */ | |
| static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio *src_bio) | |
| { | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = src_bio->bi_crypt_context; | |
| struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; | |
| blk_status_t status; | |
| status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, | |
| bc->bc_key, &slot); | |
| if (status != BLK_STS_OK) { | |
| bio_endio_status(src_bio, status); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| __blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(src_bio, | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot)); | |
| blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot); | |
| } | |
| static blk_status_t __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio, | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc, struct bvec_iter iter, | |
| struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm) | |
| { | |
| SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(ciph_req, tfm); | |
| u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; | |
| union blk_crypto_iv iv; | |
| struct scatterlist sg; | |
| struct bio_vec bv; | |
| const int data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size; | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| skcipher_request_set_callback(ciph_req, | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, | |
| NULL, NULL); | |
| memcpy(curr_dun, bc->bc_dun, sizeof(curr_dun)); | |
| sg_init_table(&sg, 1); | |
| skcipher_request_set_crypt(ciph_req, &sg, &sg, data_unit_size, | |
| iv.bytes); | |
| /* Decrypt each segment in the bio */ | |
| __bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter, iter) { | |
| struct page *page = bv.bv_page; | |
| if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size)) | |
| return BLK_STS_INVAL; | |
| sg_set_page(&sg, page, data_unit_size, bv.bv_offset); | |
| /* Decrypt each data unit in the segment */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < bv.bv_len; i += data_unit_size) { | |
| blk_crypto_dun_to_iv(curr_dun, &iv); | |
| if (crypto_skcipher_decrypt(ciph_req)) | |
| return BLK_STS_IOERR; | |
| bio_crypt_dun_increment(curr_dun, 1); | |
| sg.offset += data_unit_size; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return BLK_STS_OK; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * The crypto API fallback's main decryption routine. | |
| * | |
| * Decrypts input bio in place, and calls bio_endio on the bio. | |
| */ | |
| static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work) | |
| { | |
| struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx = | |
| container_of(work, struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, work); | |
| struct bio *bio = f_ctx->bio; | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = &f_ctx->crypt_ctx; | |
| struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; | |
| blk_status_t status; | |
| status = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, | |
| bc->bc_key, &slot); | |
| if (status == BLK_STS_OK) { | |
| status = __blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(bio, bc, | |
| f_ctx->crypt_iter, | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_tfm(slot)); | |
| blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot); | |
| } | |
| mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool); | |
| bio_endio_status(bio, status); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio - queue bio for fallback decryption | |
| * | |
| * @bio: the bio to queue | |
| * | |
| * Restore bi_private and bi_end_io, and queue the bio for decryption into a | |
| * workqueue, since this function will be called from an atomic context. | |
| */ | |
| static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio(struct bio *bio) | |
| { | |
| struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx = bio->bi_private; | |
| bio->bi_private = f_ctx->bi_private_orig; | |
| bio->bi_end_io = f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig; | |
| /* If there was an IO error, don't queue for decrypt. */ | |
| if (bio->bi_status) { | |
| mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool); | |
| bio_endio(bio); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| INIT_WORK(&f_ctx->work, blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio); | |
| f_ctx->bio = bio; | |
| queue_work(blk_crypto_wq, &f_ctx->work); | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep - Prepare a bio to use fallback en/decryption | |
| * @bio: bio to prepare | |
| * | |
| * If bio is doing a WRITE operation, allocate one or more bios to contain the | |
| * encrypted payload and submit them. | |
| * | |
| * For a READ operation, mark the bio for decryption by using bi_private and | |
| * bi_end_io. | |
| * | |
| * In either case, this function will make the submitted bio(s) look like | |
| * regular bios (i.e. as if no encryption context was ever specified) for the | |
| * purposes of the rest of the stack except for blk-integrity (blk-integrity and | |
| * blk-crypto are not currently supported together). | |
| * | |
| * Return: true if @bio should be submitted to the driver by the caller, else | |
| * false. Sets bio->bi_status, calls bio_endio and returns false on error. | |
| */ | |
| bool blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(struct bio *bio) | |
| { | |
| struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context; | |
| struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx *f_ctx; | |
| if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tfms_inited[bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode])) { | |
| /* User didn't call blk_crypto_start_using_key() first */ | |
| bio_io_error(bio); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| if (!__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, | |
| &bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg)) { | |
| bio_endio_status(bio, BLK_STS_NOTSUPP); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| if (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE) { | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(bio); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * bio READ case: Set up a f_ctx in the bio's bi_private and set the | |
| * bi_end_io appropriately to trigger decryption when the bio is ended. | |
| */ | |
| f_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool, GFP_NOIO); | |
| f_ctx->crypt_ctx = *bc; | |
| f_ctx->crypt_iter = bio->bi_iter; | |
| f_ctx->bi_private_orig = bio->bi_private; | |
| f_ctx->bi_end_io_orig = bio->bi_end_io; | |
| bio->bi_private = (void *)f_ctx; | |
| bio->bi_end_io = blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio; | |
| bio_crypt_free_ctx(bio); | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| int blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key) | |
| { | |
| return __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, key); | |
| } | |
| static bool blk_crypto_fallback_inited; | |
| static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void) | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| int err; | |
| if (blk_crypto_fallback_inited) | |
| return 0; | |
| get_random_bytes(blank_key, sizeof(blank_key)); | |
| err = bioset_init(&enc_bio_set, 64, 0, BIOSET_NEED_BVECS); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto out; | |
| /* Dynamic allocation is needed because of lockdep_register_key(). */ | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile = kzalloc_obj(*blk_crypto_fallback_profile); | |
| if (!blk_crypto_fallback_profile) { | |
| err = -ENOMEM; | |
| goto fail_free_bioset; | |
| } | |
| err = blk_crypto_profile_init(blk_crypto_fallback_profile, | |
| blk_crypto_num_keyslots); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto fail_free_profile; | |
| err = -ENOMEM; | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile->ll_ops = blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops; | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE; | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile->key_types_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW; | |
| /* All blk-crypto modes have a crypto API fallback. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF; | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_profile->modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0; | |
| blk_crypto_wq = alloc_workqueue("blk_crypto_wq", | |
| WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI | | |
| WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, num_online_cpus()); | |
| if (!blk_crypto_wq) | |
| goto fail_destroy_profile; | |
| blk_crypto_keyslots = kzalloc_objs(blk_crypto_keyslots[0], | |
| blk_crypto_num_keyslots); | |
| if (!blk_crypto_keyslots) | |
| goto fail_free_wq; | |
| blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool = | |
| mempool_create_page_pool(num_prealloc_bounce_pg, 0); | |
| if (!blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool) | |
| goto fail_free_keyslots; | |
| bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, 0); | |
| if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache) | |
| goto fail_free_bounce_page_pool; | |
| bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool = | |
| mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_fallback_crypt_ctxs, | |
| bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache); | |
| if (!bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool) | |
| goto fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache; | |
| blk_crypto_fallback_inited = true; | |
| return 0; | |
| fail_free_crypt_ctx_cache: | |
| kmem_cache_destroy(bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_cache); | |
| fail_free_bounce_page_pool: | |
| mempool_destroy(blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool); | |
| fail_free_keyslots: | |
| kfree(blk_crypto_keyslots); | |
| fail_free_wq: | |
| destroy_workqueue(blk_crypto_wq); | |
| fail_destroy_profile: | |
| blk_crypto_profile_destroy(blk_crypto_fallback_profile); | |
| fail_free_profile: | |
| kfree(blk_crypto_fallback_profile); | |
| fail_free_bioset: | |
| bioset_exit(&enc_bio_set); | |
| out: | |
| return err; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Prepare blk-crypto-fallback for the specified crypto mode. | |
| * Returns -ENOPKG if the needed crypto API support is missing. | |
| */ | |
| int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num) | |
| { | |
| const char *cipher_str = blk_crypto_modes[mode_num].cipher_str; | |
| struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp; | |
| unsigned int i; | |
| int err = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Fast path | |
| * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num] | |
| * for each i are visible before we try to access them. | |
| */ | |
| if (likely(smp_load_acquire(&tfms_inited[mode_num]))) | |
| return 0; | |
| mutex_lock(&tfms_init_lock); | |
| if (tfms_inited[mode_num]) | |
| goto out; | |
| err = blk_crypto_fallback_init(); | |
| if (err) | |
| goto out; | |
| for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) { | |
| slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i]; | |
| slotp->tfms[mode_num] = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(cipher_str, | |
| 0, 0); | |
| if (IS_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num])) { | |
| err = PTR_ERR(slotp->tfms[mode_num]); | |
| if (err == -ENOENT) { | |
| pr_warn_once("Missing crypto API support for \"%s\"\n", | |
| cipher_str); | |
| err = -ENOPKG; | |
| } | |
| slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL; | |
| goto out_free_tfms; | |
| } | |
| crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(slotp->tfms[mode_num], | |
| CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Ensure that updates to blk_crypto_keyslots[i].tfms[mode_num] | |
| * for each i are visible before we set tfms_inited[mode_num]. | |
| */ | |
| smp_store_release(&tfms_inited[mode_num], true); | |
| goto out; | |
| out_free_tfms: | |
| for (i = 0; i < blk_crypto_num_keyslots; i++) { | |
| slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[i]; | |
| crypto_free_sync_skcipher(slotp->tfms[mode_num]); | |
| slotp->tfms[mode_num] = NULL; | |
| } | |
| out: | |
| mutex_unlock(&tfms_init_lock); | |
| return err; | |
| } |